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Introduction 
As William H. Chafe so aptly pointed out in Civilities 
and Civil Rights, the agitation by blacks for civil rights 
throughout the 1960s in Greensboro, North Carolina, was a 
response to local conditions, but yet, was part of a 
national phenomenon. In 1960, four black students from 
North Carolina A&T sat-in at a local Woolworth's Department 
Store to protest the establishment's policy of not serving 
blacks at the' lunch counter. News of this local protest 
spread like wildfire throughout the country. As a result, 
Greensboro was the site of the start of a new phase in 
blicks' struggle for civil rights -- the sit-in movement.1
The "Second Revolution" had moved slowly after the 1954 
Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education of 
Topeka, but its pace greatly accelerated with the onset of 
the sit-in movement. Blacks now had a mode of protest 
highly visible and embarassing to this nation. Through 
sit-in demonstrations blacks' demands for equality and 
racial justice were heard. Other peaceful, high visibility 
forms of protest -- i.e. the freedom rides and mass 
demonstrations -- subsequently emerged and accompanied the 
sit-in tactic and its variations such as jail-ins, swim-ins, 
wade-ins, and sleep-ins in pressuring white America to do 
something about discrimination and to seek racial justice . 
As the protests continued and violence by white southerners 
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increased, the pressure escalated until the federal 
lawmakers felt compelled to act on the issue. The resulting 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 
secured political and legal rights for blacks. However, in 
the late 1960s and early 1980s, social and economic equality 
continued to elude blacks as most whites resisted the new 
phase of black activism, Black Power, and �ietnam became an 
overriding concern of the federal government. Even into the 
mid 1980s real change in this country's socio/economic 
structure has not yet occurred, and as Chafe has suggested, 
the story is not over. Nevertheless, the movement for 
change towards racial justice had begun and the overt 
practice of institutional racism has generally been 
overthrown. These have been the results of the civil rights 
movement for the nation, Greensboro, North Carolina, and 
Huntington, West Virginia. 
By 1963, the shock waves of the sit-in movement and the 
growing black unrest throughout the c?untry reached 
Huntington. This growing discontent with the status quo of 
segregation and racial discrimination and the impulse from 
the sit:in movement for direct, non-violent pro�est combined 
to mobilize several students at Marshall University who 
formed the Civic Interest Progressives (CIP), a biracial 
civil rights group. Between 1963 and 1965, the CIP, as will 
be demonstrated in this thesis, provided the spark needed to· 
challenge the existing discriminatory status quo in 
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Huntington and at Marshall University and bring about 
change. In essence, the CIP activists brought the civil 
rights movement and the demand for racial justice to this 
town and to this university, and with varying success made 
people deal with their consciences and address the issue of 
equality for all . 
The CIP's persistence in securing civil rights at 
Marshall University overlapped with its efforts in 
Huntington. Though many similarities exist between the two 
environments, the nature of the 'battle and certain 
characteristics differed. For clarity this thesis has been 
artificially divided to make it easier to understand the 
CIP's struggles in both areas . 
A number of people here at Marshall have contributed to 
this project as well as to my personal and intellectual 
maturation over the past few years . In some way, all of my 
professors have given something to me. But, Robert Sawrey 
and Frances Hensley selflessly gave of themselves on this 
project and especially challenged my perceptions of reality, 
broadened my horizons, and influenced and honed my thought 
processes. Thank You. 
Of course, the quality of students and human beings 
surrounding a person can add considerably to one's graduate· 
studies experience. My pa�t two years of graduate study 
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have been richly blessed by the students encountered and the 
friends I have made at Marshall. In particular, I would 
like to thank John Hennen, Montserrat Chambers, Joe Eckhart 
and Sally Keaton for all their help, companionship and human 
kindness. Also, my parents and in-laws have been sources of 
support. However, the most thanks goes to my best friend 
and wife, Angela, for all her loving support and 
encouragement. 
Many have aided on this project. I would like to thank 
the members of the Special Collections Department in the 
Morrow Library for their deligence and patience. Special 
thanks go to Phil Carter, Bunche Gray, Michael Gray, Simon 
Perry, and Charles Aurand for sacrificing their time to 
share their memories and perceptions during oral history 
interviews. Finally, I need once again to thank my wife, 
Angela, for contributing her opinions and for typing most of 
the original manuscript. To everybody, including those I 
did not name who have contributed to my maturation or this 
thesis, thank you . 
1
William H. Chafe, Civilities and Civil Rights (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1981) has been a model for 
ih\s work. 
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Chapter I 
Cast, Characters, and Philosophy of the CIP 
The Civic Interest Progressives (GIP) formed in the 
spring of 1963 after two whites, William S. "Chip" Caldwell 
and Joseph McBride, approached Phil Carter, Marshall 
University student and athlete, about several issues 
important to black students and, apparently, to a few 
interested white students. Of foremost concern was the 
practice of segregation and overt racial discrimination in 
Huntington. From this small beginning, Carter gathered 
other concerned students to form a civil rights group to 
overcome off-campus racial discrimination by working closely 
with the West Virginia and Huntington Human Rights 
C . . 1 ommissions. 
As early as February 22, 1963, the MU student paper, 
The Parthenon reported the planned formation of the CIP, 
known initially as the "Marshall Action Group," on the MU 
campus. This broad based, biracial organization espoused 
non-violent principles to oppose racial discrimination in 
establishments serving Marshall students, and was loosely 
affiliated with the national Student Non-violent 
Coordinating Committee (SNCC). By March 8, 1963, the group 
had adopted the name Civic Interest Progressives and further 
defined its purpose. The CIP sought to eliminate 
"discriminatory conditions and practices directed towarcl 
minority groups in and around the Huntington area.112 The
CIP concentrated its efforts on gaining access to an 
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""'"''t.Jtrrestricted social life, equal job opportunities, and fair 
l'r<Jusing for minorities. To attain these goals, the CIP 
activists followed three modes of operation: contacting and 
.� � ,{"naeling complaints through appropriate campus and 
community channels, discussions with owners of 
establishments practicing discrimination, and finally, if 
all else failed, direct non-violent protest.3
To carry out such a program against racial 
discrimination, a dedicated core, or inner circle, of 
members was essential. Such a core of about twelve to 
fifteen activists emerged and functioned, with minimal 
turnover, as the heart of the CIP during its more than two 
years of existence. Some were black, some were white and 
most were male; however, all were Marshall University 
students committed to the cause of civil rights and racial 
justice. Significantly, most CIP members, about eighty 
percent, came from some place other than Huntington. Only 
Rick Diehl, Tom Stafford, Michael Gray and Mary Hall were 
natives of Huntington. This characteristic may have reduced 
local influences and restrictions on the organization.4
Lydia Curry, William Caldwell, Joseph McBride, Mary 
Hall, Mary Moore, Charles Gordon, Rdbert Bloom and Patricia 
Austin comprised the original CIP executive committee.5
This organizational set up was an attempt to avoid possible 
power stuggles within the group. Conspicuously absent from· . 
this committee, however, was Phil Carter. Carter believed 
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this was done purposefully in order to protect him from 
reprisals that might damage his basketball career. As a 
star basketball player at Washington Irving High School in 
Clarksburg, West Virginia, he came to Marshall to play major 
college basketball after reading an article in a spurts 
magazine about the university and Hal Greer, a famous black 
professional basketball player who played at Marshall. The 
black community in Clarksburg rallied to provide �arter with 
a job, a scholarship, and a place to stay in Huntington so 
he could attend college. Once at Marshall, Carter earned a 
basketball scholarship with the help of Dick Hall, a white 
alumnus of Washington Irving High School. Carter later 
recalled that that was "really when I began to figure out 
and understand the value of white friendships and networks 
and the 'old boy' network.116 
Despite his omission from the official CIP executive 
committee list, Phil Carter was, if any one person was, the 
leader, but he had a great deal of support from people like 
Frank Helvey, Pat Austin, Danie Stewart, Rick Diehl, and 
others. Carter was articulate and "intelligent about his 
radicalism.117 He was well read and understood the
complexities of power structures, how society ope�ated, and 
the need for civil rights. Simon Perry, an instructor in 
the Political Science department, believed that Carter's 
awareness of the civil rights movement coupled with his 
personal qualities led him to be, 
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. .. an outstanding leader. I think he followed the 
movement nationally, and received a great deal of 
instruction about what to do simply by his 
observation of what was happening elsewhere. He 
was, in my judgment, a very dynamic, forceful, 
perceptive young man. He had lots of charisma, 
and this enabled him to develop a fairly lar'ge 
following o� students, both black and wgite. And, 
they acted 1n a very courageous manner. 
Carter led by example, but he was also a teacher to.the 
CIP activists. Carter knew what civil rights in American 
society was all about and how to convey these concepts to 
others. One of Carter's proteges, Michael Gray, viewed him 
as a teacher, but admitted Carter's qualities as a leader 
dominated his perception of him: 
We felt that Phil was articulate, intelligent, 
had a lot of guts, and like my mother [Bunche 
Gray] in this area [civil rights] spoke his mind. 
Those were combinations that you don't find, and 
there was a need for leadership on the campus. 
So, it was almost9impossible not to be impressed
with Phil Carter . 
Among the other leaders of the CIP, Frank Helvey was 
the top, white, male leader. Apparently, some care was 
taken to emphasize the biracial nature of the organization 
and Helvey, who was a little older than most of the student 
activists, had the leadership ability and wisdom that the 
CIP needed. Helvey also had personal and intellectual 
qualities very similar to Carter's, and tended to be a calm, 
rational person who had a settling influence on the group's 
emotions.10
Pat Austin was also a part of the CIP leadership. She 
was the only female leader in the CIP, a predominantly male 
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organization. In Michael Gray's opinion, sex1sm did exist 
in the CIP, "This civil rights group was no different than 
other civil rights groups, except I think we were a little 
better, but a little sexist ... No doubt about that. Except I 
think Pat probably ... made CIPers less sexist than SNCC 
d h . 1111 an ... ot er groups ...• If Gray's analysis of minimal 
sexism is correct, the CIP would probably have been one of 
the least sexist activist groups in the country. Many civil 
rights organfzations practiced blatant sexism through rigid 
work roles and peer pressure for sexual favors, particularly 
in biracial situations. Sara Evans in Personal Politics 
has argued that this sexist experience in actiyist groups, 
including tqe New Left fomented female consciousnesses on a 
national level. There is simply no way of determining to 
what degree the CIP fit into Evans' thesis, although the CIP 
probably practiced ,some sexism which contributed to this 
phenomena of raising female consciousness. Yet, the CIP 
probably was no� as sexist as many other civil rights groups 
because of Pat Austin's presence in a leadership position. 
She and Phil Carter represented a tandem that was always at 
the forefront of demonstrations and protests, and Austin led 
the group in its final year, 1964-65. While Austin 
obviously rose above the traditional female roles, other 
female CIP members may have performed in a more traditional, 
subordinate manner.
12
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Besides her leadership, Pat Austin provided the CIP 
with two other valuable assets--her writing ability and 
knowledge of t'he media, especially the print media. 
Whenever the CIP needed to make a public announcement or 
present written protests, Austin wrote the appropriate 
material. Coverage of the GIP remained constant and' 
thorough in The Parthenon. As a The Parthenon reporter and 
journalism major, Austin either wrote the articles or, at 
least, made sure that someone on The Parthenon staff covered 
the CIP's activities. In addition, Austin understood how 
the media functioned and courted'coverage of CI� activities 
by the newspapers, radio and television. She and other 
members, such as Dave Peyton, knew how to obtain the maximum 
attention of the media corps. As a result, The Huntington 
Herald Dispatch and the Charleston, West Virginia, papers 
also covered the CIP's activities throughout the 
organization's existence. Phil Carter believed that by 
going to the Charleston papers "the cancer [racism as 
defined as any form of racial discrimination or segregation] 
of West Virginia, which included the leadership of 
Huntington and Marshall University, came before the public 
for all to see.1113 In this way, the CIP obtained leverage
for opposing racial discrimination. Consequently, Austin's 
expertise with the media proved invaluable. 
Rick Diehl was another important leader in the CIP. · -ije 
was the son of Vincent Diehl, one nf the owners of the
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Bradshaw-Diehl Department Store in Huntington. This store, 
along with Anderson-Newcomb, was one of the two major 
department stores in the city. Although the Diehl name 
stood as a symbol of Huntington's social and economic 
establishment, Rick Diehl, a former conservative Young 
Republican, turned his back on his family's status and the 
Huntington establishment when he joined the ranks of the 
CIP. Even worse, he became a lieutenant of the activist 
group, a definite embarrassment to many influential, white 
Huntingtonians, including his father. Vincent Diehl had a 
terrible time accepting his son's actions. An anecdote told 
by Bunche Gray illustrates this point: "His daddy was 
leaning down, drinking some water from the fountain in 
Bradshaw-Diehl's store. I walked up to him and I leaned 
down and said, 'We want you for the movement. ' And Vincent 
Diehl stood up and said, 'You already have my son! 11114
While Vincent Diehl had a difficult time accepting his son's 
activities, Michael Gray believed that "the power structure 
had ten times more difficult a time dealing with it." Gray 
concluded, "th'e [white] power structure hated Rick Diehl. 11
1 5 
At times, other CIP activists like Cicero Fain, Tom 
Stafford, and Danie Stewart acted in leadership roles. Fain 
who described himself as an "angry black man" in the 1960s, 
led by example and resolve.16 Stafford grew up in.
Huntington and therefore supplied a local expertise crucial 
to the CIP success in Huntington. Also, Stafford created 
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the CIP ''share-in" tactic which is fully explained in
Chapter III. Stewart acted as the politician of the CIP and 
utilized this expertise on the group's behalf.
The backgrounds of all these CIP leaders reflect the 
organization's diversity and explain its ability to function
as a civil rights challenge organization. Everybody had a
different role to play in the CIP and that role depended 
upon the individual's abilities and willingness to act. In 
essence, the CIP practiced "situational leadership." If an 
individual felt strongl� about doing something and believed 
he or she could control the situation and was willing to 
take the responsibility, then that person was the leader of 
the activity and the rest of the CIP members supported the 
effort. This• concept, like SNCC' s "participatory 
democracy," caused some di sun_i t y within the organization but 
provided the flexibility necessary to accomodate the diverse 
b·1· . f h C . . 17 capa 1 1t1es o t e IP act1v1sts. 
The CIP enjoyed perhaps the best of all possible 
relationships with SNCC -- autonomy yet with assistance. 
SNCC did not proyide monetary support and the CIP activists 
trained themselves by reading and watching what happened 
elsewhere. Marshall University professors Simon Perry, Bill
Cook, Paul Stewart and Gerald Kumer aided by providing books
and suggestions. However, SNCC did provide advice, through 
liason Lafayette Surney, to the CIP leaders. Also, Phil
Carter and Pat Austin occasionally traveled to SNCC's
I 
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headquarters 1n Atlanta to participate in workshops and met
civil rights leaders from across the nation. These two had
further associations with members from the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) 
and Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), and received a great 
deal of help and advice on strategy from Neal Shahan, a 
native of the Nitro, West Virginia area and a high school 
18teacher in Annapolis, Maryland. 
The CIP also received aid from local sympathizers. The 
blac� community in Huntington quietly supported the CIP's 
actions and thus played an important role in the 
organization's efforts. Yet, Michael Gray recalls that in 
the 1960s "black Huntingtonians [were] pretty dependent ... on 
the white structure to make a living.1119 Consequently,
Huntington blacks had to be careful of showing too much 
t�tport for the CIP because of their economic dependency on 
·l�e l!tl\i_te-con trolled economy. However, the white power
" $1:liiuc.ture never fully exploited the economic dependency of 
the,�Jack community. It really did not have to because most 
Even so, many members of 
black community supported the CIP through 
food and money, and other more subtle ways . 
were the shock troops, while the role of 
consisted of valuable "behind the 
and contributions.20
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A few members of Huntington's black community visibly 
stood out in support of the CIP. For example, Marion T. 
"Bunche" Gray and her sister Antoinette Lease opened their 
homes to the CIP for private group meetings. James Gipson 
and Herbert Henderson provided legal services for the CIP. 
Gipson served as the official CIP attorney, but Henderson, 
as the attorney for the Huntington chapter of the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), 
is more noted for having fought the early legal battles for 
the CIP .. Eventually, however, Henderson and the CIP went in 
separate directions. Additional support came from Gus 
Cleckly and Andrew McDade, leaders of the Huntington Chapter 
of the NAACP. Reverend Charles Smith of the First Baptist 
Church rallied what he could of the religious community and 
became a strong, outspoken advocate of civil rights. He 
later served on the West Virginia Human Rights Commission as 
did Mrs. Memphis T. Garrison, a local black activist. 
Though black Huntingtonians helped the CIP in these and many 
other ways, they did not control the CIP. Their supportive 
actions always s�rved the CIP's initiative withotit dictating 
decisions or activities. In describing his role with the 
CIP, Herbert Henderson emphasized the group's -autonomy: 
No one outside the group was controlling 
them. T�eir protests were planned and executed by 
them. My job was to give them support. I would 
�ounsel them about how to �icket without getting 
into deep trouble with the law. And, of course, I 
defended them after they were arrested and 
charged. I helped organize bail bonds for them. 
I. 
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But I never advised them when to picket and 21against whom. Those ideas were theirs alone." 
Yet, one black Huntingtonian, Bunche Gray, had a 
definite impact upon the CIP activists. As already 
mentioned, the door to her home always stood open to the CIP 
members. But also, she was willing to risk speaking her 
mind and acting upon her convictions. These were attractive 
qualities to students putting themselves on the front lines 
against racial discrimination. She was the rock of 
stability these civil rights activists needed and sought 
out. Similar to the role assumed by black women in civil 
rights activities throughout th� South, Bunche Gray 
represented a mother figure for the CIP and the young black 
activists in Huntington. Bunche Gray also often acted as a 
personal counselor to CIP activists. She always advised 
students to pursue their own goals and not to worry abo4t 
setting pitfalls for enemies from the past. Bunche Gray 
believed in forgiving, moving ahead and giving justice a 
chance to prevai1.22
Bunche Gray challenged people to examine themselves and 
others around them. She extolled the virtue of honest� and 
believed that an individual should confront friends and 
acquaintances with statements and actions in order to force 
a person to reveal his or her inner self. Perhaps the best 
way to describe Gray's effect on the CIP activists is to use
• 
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the words Phil Carter wrote in Bunche Gray's address book on 
June 1, 1965: 
The Meeting 
From the depths of despair comes a human 
relationship that is enthralling and rich. This 
experience is enthralling to me because you are 
radiant with hope and a keep your head up 
philosophy which you so adamently espouse and 
which you so violently act out and upon. This 
experience is rich to me because you have 
instilled within me a significant amount of your 
belief in the full, thick quality of life. 
Due to the meeting, I have had to re-evaluate 
myself and my initial so called friends and now 
have a renewed interest in this definition of· 
friendship. 
You would be surprised to know that I cannot 
express my opinion of you nor my need for you. 
But then being as perceptive as you are, you have 
probably [by] now [already realized] this since 
you met me which was a time before I really met 
you. With all sincerity, I feel I have profited 
from your advice to me the: 
1) family man
2) to the confused, immature kid
3) the fake humaniterian
4) the weak leader
5) the lonely man
6) the man who wants to love or maybe he
already does and is afraid to admit it. 
Mrs. Gray with all my sincerity, thank you. 
Philip W. Carter.23
The extent of Bunche Gray's influence on the CIPs can 
terhaps best be judged by realizing that the group adopted 
ilmo$t all of her personal philosophy for its own 
Bunche Gray challenged people, including the 
f activists, to examine themselves and others around them. 
Huntington business managers and owners 
and to acknowledge black civil rights. 
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Both :he CIP and Bunche Gray were willin� to use 
confrontational tactics if needed to make a point or expose 
discrimination 
The CIP presented and maintained a public philosophy 
resembling Martin Luther King, Jr. 's moderate, non-violent 
position . Every CIP demonstration used non-violent, direct 
action tactics. In only a couple of minor incidents was 
this creed violated. Close associates of the ClP such as 
Bunche Gray, Herbert Henderson, and Dr. Simon Perry 
personally espoused King's non-violent philosophy and 
believed the CIP activists did likewise. The CIP publicly 
adhered to King's non-violence strategy and no doubt many of 
the activists fully advocated the concept. Privately, 
however, some CIP leaders, particularly Carter, sympathized 
with the message of Malcolm X and other black militants . 
They concluded that sometimes correction of an unfair 
situation required force, not words.2
4 
Yet, Carter realized that non-violent tactics would be 
more effective in Huntington, West Virginia. Black 
militancy worked best where white resistance was strong and 
blacks were numerous. In Hunting�on, blacks represented a 
small minoritv and the whites, out of ignorance and apathy, 
basically ignored race problems. The CIP would not have to
make much of a noise to shock most Huntington1ans into
increased civil rights awareness. Hence, the CIP needed to 
confront people directly with their practices of racial
I 
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discrimination and force them to make a decision, namely 
integrate or maintain the status quo. The CIP repeatedly 
utilized this tactic as part of what Carter calls the 
"conflict utilization theory." If at first, words did not 
sway a resistor, then the CIP used demonstrations to bring 
the conflict directly into the public arena. From there, 
the pressure escalated as the CIP would tenaciously continue 
pressing the issue. Eventually, either the resistor or the 
Clph d . 1· 
25 Th. ·1 d a to capitu ate. is was a strategy ta1 or ma e
for Huntington.where adverse publicity and public 
embarrassment and pressure proved to be effective weapons. 
So, armed with the cause of civil rights, a dedicated core 
of activists and supporting cast, and a non-violent, 
conflict utilization philosophy, the CIP was ready to 
grapple with overt racial discrimination in Huntington. 
• 
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Chapter 11 
"The Tentacles of Racial Discrimination 111
When the CIP formed in the Spring of 1963, the civil 
rights organization concentrated its efforts on the 
Huntington community. Though a student group based at 
Marshall University, the CIP initially addressed the 
problems in Huntington because Marshall's black students had 
to abide by the rules of the Huntington environment which 
included wide ranging discrimination.2
In her study of the Human Rights Commission of 
Huntington, Nancy Potter Matthews convincingly argued that 
in the early 1960s Huntington was an uninviting environment 
for blacks: 
In a border state like West Virginia or a 
municipality like Huntington with a very small 
Negro population, the color line exists by tacit 
agreement instead �f law. Negroes were denied 
equal access to many parts of the public arena 
that white citizens took for granted; they were 
restricted to the lower levels of industrial 
occupation; they were seldom ever allowed to enter 
the white-only area of management; they were 
restricted to a specific residential area; and 
they were generally excluded from private circles 
of white association. In comparison to the deep 
South, there was less overt hostility and 
denigration, less conventional prejudice, but this 
merely made whites less aware of the 3olor linewhile Negroes felt it just as keenly. 
However, Cecil B. Moore, Philadelphia attorney and 
President of the NAACP, spoke in Huntington on July 14, 
1963, and noted that race relations in Huntington were good 
compared to many places he had seen. Moore said Huntington 
blacks "didn't feel the pang and thrust here that [blacks 
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·. in] other cities felt where there are signs which say
'colored' and 'white. 1114 Nonetheless, Moore added that the
"picture in Huntington is not as rosy as yo·u may think," and 
he urged local blacks to fight poor housing, the lack of 
employment opportunities and more subtle forms of 
discrimination that existed in Huntington.5
No doub� Huntington was better than many southern 
environs. However, a significant amount of overt racial 
discrimination did exist in Huntington in 1963. That summer 
an article in The Herald Dispatch claimed that most 
restaurants and all theaters and major hotels in Huntington 
reportedly served blacks.6 But, in actuality, blacks and
whites could eat together in only one restaurant and could 
not drink together in any. Camden Park had an annual 
"Colored Day," the only day on which blacks could enter the 
amusement park. To see a movie together, according to Phil 
Carter, one had to ask, "Which movies can blacks go to, and 
what days, and would we have to sit upstairs.117 The Keith
Albee Theater hosted an annual "Preaching Mission." For one 
week a year, preachers were brought in from all over the 
country and large numbers of blacks attended. However, the 
Keith Albee's doors remained closed to blacks after that one 
week. To see a movie blacks had to go to another movie 
theater in town. These are just a sample of the obstacles 
that confronted Huntington area blacks, including those 
attending Marshall University. Black Marshall students 
• 
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keenly felt the shackles of Huntington's racial 
discrimination and led the way in denouncing it.8
19 
Bruce Moody, a graduating black basketball player, 
lashed out at Huntington's discrimination in a May 1962 The 
Parthenon article. In one sentence, Moody summed up the 
black experience in Huntington, "Racial discrimination is 
practiced in movies, restaurants, amusement parks, and 
9 employment." Moody recounted four specific incidents to 
illustrate his point about racial barriers in Huntington . 
Campus Sundries, a fast food establishment which catered to 
Marshall students, willingly served white students within 
the establishment, but offered only carry out service to 
black students. Also, a black student had been denied 
entrance because of his race into an American Legion dance 
supposedly open to all Marshall students. The third 
incident involved two black members of a physical education 
class who could not enter the Riviera Golf course as part of 
a class field trip. Finally, Moody wrote about another 
physical education class where black students could enter 
Colonial Lanes, a bowling alley, as part of the class, but 
not as black individuals when they sought to return later.10
These four incidents related by Moody could convey only 
a fraction of the magnitude of the problem, a problem most 
white Huntingtonians were not aware of or simply ignored. 
This pervasive discriminaitor
t
, however, became permanently 
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imprinted upon many black Marshall students. As Moody 
wrote: 
The tentacles of racial discrimination 
stretch out into many different areas. In order 
to avoid any kind of embarrassment, many Negroes 
on Marshall's campus tend to practice a self 
imposed discrimination. This type restricts their 
social life almost exclusively to themselves. It 
is a possible result of prior restriction� on and 
off campus, that gives them the need to coni�rm 
and to hide themselves in a group identity. 
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The need for civil rights was evident in Huntington but 
nobody wanted to take charge and lead the way. The white 
power structure had no reason to alter the status quo and no 
intention of doing so. The Huntington Human Rights 
Commission, formed in 1963, had no real power and acted only 
as a sounding board to hear complaints. This satisfied the 
power structure which did not have to deal with the matter, 
and appeased some blacks and liberal whit�s with a facade of 
12 concern. The West Virginia Human Rights Commission, which
had been in place since 1961, seemingly could or would do 
little about local situations because of its newness or lack 
of power. Both organizations relied heavily upon 
persuasion. For many blacks the human rights commissions 
did not represent mechanisms for positive change . 
Yet, the black community feared that civil rights 
agitation would result in economic retribution from the 
white power structure. The potential turn�d to reality 
often enough to justify the fear. Consequently, few black 
were willing to endorse publicly civil rights efforts.13
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Throughout the state, the black community was restrained on 
the civil rights issue because of its economic dependency 
and small population. Only about 89,000 blacks resided in 
West Virginia in 1960; this represents about 4.6 percent of 
the total state population and also one of the smallest 
black populations in the region. All states bordering West 
Virginia had considerably larger black populations.14 The
black population of Cabell County and Huntington hovered at 
a little less than five percent.15 This indicates a small
population base from which to draw upon for protests. So, 
mass demonstrations were impossible and that limited what 
civil rights activities could take place . 
The ministers in Huntington, by following the lead of 
southern counterparts, could have been a strong, positive 
force for civil rights considering the influence religion 
had in the community. Yet, they failed to do so. The 
Huntington Ministerial Association (HMA) split on a ratio of 
two to one against the issue of civil rights. One member of 
the HMA articulated that, "they felt you shouldn't roil the 
waters.1116 None of the larger churches on Fifth Avenue 
supported civil rights� Only a few smaller churches, mostly 
black in membership, and a handful of pastors spoke in favor 
of civil rights. Probably the most fervent of the pro-civil 
rights pastors was Charles Smith, a black minister at the 
First Baptist Church. Besides opening his church as a base 
for civil rights activists, Reverend Smith worked with the 
• 
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CIP, the Huntington and West Virginia Human Rights 
Commissions, and the business and community leaders to bring 
about change, but only after the CIP's initial protest 
actions. Black minister Reverend H-arry Coleman of Ebenezer 
United Methodist also supported civil rights activities. 
Reverend Royce MacDonald, a white minister at Enslow Park 
Presbyterian Church, acted in similar fashion to Reverend 
Smith concerning work with the Human Rights commissions and 
community leaders; however, he was far less vocal and 
considerably less effective. Reverend Charles Aurand of St. 
Paul's Lutheran Church, and other white ministers, including 
Reverend McDonald, went against the sentiment of their 
congregations and did what they could on their own to fight 
for racial justice. Nevertheless, no representative from 
the religious community or anywhere else in Huntington came 
to the forefront to fight for black Huntingtonians' rights, 
let alone struggle for the needs and demands of Marshall's 
black students.17
Realizing that help was not forthcoming from the 
community at large, many blacks looked toward Marshall 
University for leadership in achieving civil rights. Bunche 
Gray, for example, believed that Marshall University as a 
citadel of higher education was responsible not only for its 
own environment but also for _Huntington. She insisted that 
Marshall should have taken the lead in the 1960s and dragged 
Huntington into the civil rights era along with it.18 Bruce
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Moody, while acknowledging that off-campus discrimination 
and racial problems were not the specific concern of 
Marshall, wrote the following plea/challenge for help in 
fighting Huntington's discrimination and making the 
community environment a better place for black students and 
black residents: 
These problems I have mentioned are all 
problems that exist in Huntington today. If 
nothing is done about them, they will exist 
·tomorrow and for the years to come. I am quite
sure that if the necessary changes are to come
about, they will be product of a joint effort of
all those involved. I have a great deal of faith
and confidence in Marshall University and feel
that it will aid in allevi�ting the present
conditions in Huntington.
Quite naturally, looking toward Marshall for leadership
meant looking toward President Stewart H. Smith. By the 
early 1960s Smith, who had become President in 1946, had 
established himself as a leader at Marshall and in 
Huntington. Smith had previously worked to gain access for 
blacks to certain formerly all white establishments in 
Huntington. A major reason for this was that Marshall had 
to provide accommodations for Qlack and white athletes on 
visiting Mid-American Conference (MA�) teams.20 As a
result, the restaurants and hotels which served visiting 
black athletes began catering to all blacks. Even so, 
Smith's efforts merely made a bad situation a little more 
tolerable. Marshall University represented the 
southern-most MAC school and visiting teams felt 
• 
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uncomfortable being in Huntington. Smith's efforts were not 
completely successful if Phil Carter's view that blacks on 
"The Mid-American Conference [teams] hated.like hell to come 
· 21 here ... " was correct. Consequently, Marshall's black 
athletes shielded the visiting black athletes in the early 
1960s from individuals and establishments hostile to blacks . 
Sadly, President Smith morally and intellectually supported 
civil rights, but his leadership in opposing discrimination 
ended after urging several hotels and restaurants to 
integrate and accommodate visiting MAC athletic teams. 
And yet, members of the CIP, other students at 
Marshall, and black Huntingtonians looked to President Smith 
for leadership. For example, by March 27, 1963, the CIP had 
tested for, found, and reported discriminatory practices at 
three Huntington establishments. The report, filed with the 
University Human Rights Commission, a Student Senate 
committee, cited Colonial Lanes (a bowling alley), Thabit's 
Delicatessen, and the White Pantry as practicing 
discrimination. Colonial Lanes refused to let black 
Marshall students bowl. The other two establishments 
refused to serve black students inside the premises, but 
offered blacks carry out service. Stuart Thomas, an MU 
senior from Hurricane, read the CIP reports to Marshall's 
Student Senate and recommended on behalf of the University 
Human Rights Commission "that the Student Government request 
the university administration to express to these 
• 
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establishments the concern of the student body re�arding the 
discriminations against its members.11
22 This was a small
gesture to be sure, but one that could have -proven effective 
if Smith had used his influence in the community. 
No evidence exists to indicate that the recommendation 
was ever acted upon, but just three weeks later, on April 
15, 1963, President Smith met with Reverend Royce MacDonald 
from the Huntington Human Rights Commission, Howard 
McKinney, head of the West Virginia Human Rights Commission, 
a Dr. Walker, and Deans Lillian Buskirk and John Shay, 
concerning discrimination in Huntington.23 Two days later
Smith released the following statement on discrimination: 
Continuing racial discrimination in several 
public places in Huntington, affecting some of our 
students, including foreign students, has caused 
embarrassment to these students, to the University 
and to the city of Huntington. 
Marshall University took the initiative in 
the elimination of discriminatory practices before 
the Supreme Court decision in 1954 and has been a 
leader in promoting the same throughout 
Huntington. Our University continually endeavors 
to bring about mutual understanding and respect 
among all racial, religious and ethnic groups 
represented in its student body and faculty. 
The primary reason why racial discrimination 
in America must ultimately be ended is because it 
is fundamentally wrong. Racial discrimination 
contradicts and violates the essentials of 
democracy. The principles of American Democracy 
which provide for equality of opportunity and 
which are taught throughout our systems of public 
and private education will have little meaning or 
significance if they are not practiced by an 
educated citizenry . 
The people of Huntington are to be commended 
for the progress toward providing equal dignity 
and opportunity to the Negro in the past ten years 
than was achieved in the preceding ninety years . 
• 
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While we are strongly opposed to all forms of 
coercion or public demonstrations, we pledge our 
assistance to the State and Huntington Human 
Rights Commissions in �heir efforts to end 
discriminatory practices through discussions and 
throug24every other available fair and ethical
means. 
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Through this document, a clear picture of Smith's 
position emerged. He rejected the concept of racial 
discrimination and noted the ill effect the practice had on 
MU and the Huntington community. Nevertheless, President 
Smith diluted his principles when he commended Huntington's 
citizenry and reaffirmed his suppport for the organizations 
set up by the white power structure to deal with race 
problems . In no way did President Smith support the actions 
and position of the CIP, hence the wording " ... strongly 
opposed to all forms of coercion or public demonstrations." 
In short, President Smith was ready to talk about civil 
rights, but little more. He certainly was not going to have 
Marshall University lead the fight for civil rights and 
racial justice. By April 1963 the CIP activists had come to 
realize this, and begun to take the initiative themselves. 
As Phil Carter foreshadowed in a statement at a forum on 
integration in 1962, "the storm is coming .. ·.we can face it 
together, or we can face it separately. 1125 Ih 1963, the CI·P
activists stood alone for the cause of civil rights in 
Huntington, West Virginia; they brought the "storm" to 
Huntington and later to Marshall University. 
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Chapter III 
. The Storm Comes to Huntington 
Armed with the cause. of civil rights, the need for 
chanie, and a philosophy of confrontation, the CIP attacked 
racial discrimination in Huntington, West Virginia. Phil 
Carter recalled, "we challenged people to do something. We 
challenged the Huntington people and the Huntington students 
to do something for themselves.111 This statement suggests
that most of the CIP activists were from someplace other 
than Huntington. Only a few courageous local souls braved 
the wrath of the Huntington community, and only one of the 
original eight on the executive committee, Mary T. Hall, was 
from Huntington. Throughout the life of the organization, 
2few Huntington residents became members of the CIP. 
Carter's usage of the word "challenged" refers to the 
" c on f 1 i c t u t .i 1 i z a t i on theory" w hi ch Car t er and the C IP 
adhered to as a tactic as well as a philosophy. As Carter 
further elaborated: 
We usually would go into an establishment, 
and try and find out if they would serve us . 
Usually you could just assume that ninety-nine 
percent of the time you were not going to be 
served. And it was because no one had ever been 
in there before and asked to be served .... Each 
time you did that you really didn't know what the 
reaction would be. You really didn't know when 
someone would get up and knock the Hell out of you 
or pull a gun on you or try to cut you or lock the 
establishment up or call the police on you or call 
up the local Big Green me�ber ... and say 'take this
black guy's scholarship.' 
Conflict utilization required that CIP members face up to 
conflict rather than inconvenience themselves by going out 
33 
of their way to patronize establishments where they were 
sure to be welcomed. Conflict utilization also meant taking 
advantage of an existing racial conflict to expose local 
racial discrimination and demand its end. Consequently, a 
lot of quiet integration took place in Huntington. 
Individual black CIP members would enter establishments and 
ask for service. This would force the owners of the 
establishments to act, by either serving the black 
student(s) or clinging to tradition. Many owners opted to 
serve the black students rather than have any trouble with 
d 
. 4 protest emonstrations. 
Some CIP protests grew out of such deliberate testing 
actions by blacks. Others resulted from reports by white 
students who had over�heard white business owners bragging 
fearlessly about not serving blacks. However, many of the 
original CIP activists got their first taste of protesting 
racial discrimination in the Spring of 1962 as their 
graduation present to Bruce Moody, a black basketball player 
at Marshall University. They sought to avenge the 
discriminatory treatment he had received at the Palace 
Theater. After getting no satisfaction from the Palace 
Theater management, Moody and several of his black friends 
at Marshall planned to picket the establishment. On the 
evening before the initial demonstration at the Palace 
Theater, the would-be pickets met at the home of Bunche and 
Conklin Gray to make signs. The next morning, Easter 
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Sunday, the picketing began. Easter Sunday had been 
· selected by the demonstrators because of the apt religious
symbolism surrounding the Christian belief in Christ's
resurrection from the tomb on Easter.5
Yet, even before the demonstration, apprehension 
mounted in the black Huntington community. Mrs. Memphis T . 
Garrison, a member of the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and later a member of 
the West Virginia Human Rights Commission (WVHRC) and 
recipient of an honorary doctorate in 1970 from Marshall 
University,6 expressed concern about the CIP. activists' plan
to protest at the Palace Theater. Gray remembered relating 
to Garrison in no uncertain words, "I'm getting damn sick 
and tired of hearing your mouth. And I'll see you in Hell, 
honey." On Easter morning Garrison called Gray and asked 
where the students were. After hearing the student 
demonstrators were in front of the Palace Theater as 
planned, Garrison said, "Thank God.117 Garrison represented
the "old guard" of black activists in Huntington and the 
apprehension this group felt about upsetting the status quo 
had prompted the first phone call. By Easter morning, 
however, she reportedly had overcome her fears and 
acknowledged the necessity of the action. After less than 
two weeks of picketing, the Palace theater management agreed 
to discontinue discriminatory practices.8
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Within a year, many of the pickets at the Palace 
Theater had joined the CIP, and together they spearheaded 
the deliberate planning and execution of the initial CIP-led 
demonstrations in Huntington. The CIP'·s first target was 
Bailey's Cafeteria, one of Huntington's most respected 
establishments. The idea of protesting Bailey's policy of 
not serving black customers originated from a white CIP 
member because Bailey's was a popular restaurant in 
Huntington that catered to middle class and professional 
whites. Consequently, many important people ate at 
Bailey's. In a sense, a blow against Bailey's symbolized a 
. ' h. 9blow against Huntington s w ite power structure . 
Yet, before engaging in a direct non-violent 
demonstration, the CIP followed its method of operation and 
tried to persuade Bailey's to serve blacks. The CIP 
conferred with the Huntington Human Rights Commission about 
Bailey's policy of not serving blacks, but garnered no 
satisfaction or support from this "proper channel.1110 Next,
two black students and one white student conversed with 
Bailey's Cafeteria co-owner and manager Floyd E. Walker 
about integrating the cafeteria. Walker told the students 
he would not change the policy of not serving blacks because 
he feared the cafeteria would lose considerable revenue from 
the white clientele who regularly patronized the 
establishment. He further noted that Bailey's had served 
blacks, specifically those on athletic teams, in the past 
• 
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but only after the cafeteria had closed to the general
public. Walker knew his answer did not satisfy the students 
and later admitted he suspected that a demonstration would 
occur at Bailey's, but he could not have guessed the form 
11
the protest took. 
On Thursday, April 25, 1963, between five and six p.m., 
ten Marshall University students, five white and five black, 
staged a "share-in" at Bailey's Cafeteria. Tom Stafford, a 
CIP member, created the "share-in" concept to perpetuate a 
"new social reality" based on racial equality and the ideals 
of justice, brotherhood and love.12 However, the share-in
concept, as related by Phil Carter, proved to be an 
innovative and effective tactic as well: 
We would try to find creative ways of not breaking 
the law. And, we went through this 
rationalization that one way not to break the law 
was to have white students go into these 
restaurants, purchase the food, and since the law 
said or the managers kept telling us 'we don't 
serve you, and we don't serve them, or the law 
doesn't allow us to serve you,' then we said it 
wouldn't make any difference if the whites then 
would share their food since we wouldn't have to 
buy it. It wouldn't be a big problem to anyone. 
And there'd be whites sit1 �ng there who would share their food with us. 
The share-in tactic was deliberately plotted by the CIP 
to force Bailey's to let blacks eat within the restaurant. 
The five white students, Aubrey King, Tom Stafford, William 
"Chip" �aldwell, Robert Woken and an unidentified female 
student, entered the restaurant, ordered food and sat down 
• 
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at a table. Afterwards the five black Marshall students, 
Phil Carter, Gus Cleckley, George Hicks, Willie Tucker, and 
Pat Austin, filed into Bailey's serving line. When the 
management refused to serve the black students, the white 
students offered to share their food and table with their 
black friendsA No incidents took place but Walker had each 
14demonstrator photographed as a record. 
Though limited, the share-in was a successful protest 
tactic because the restaurants had great difficulty 
combating it. The management had no idea which white 
students would buy food and share it with black students, 
and the restaurants had to serve all white Marshall students 
or suffer devastating economic losses. Yet, the share-in 
depended upon access to the establishment. For example, the 
CIP organized another successful "share-in" at Bailey's on 
the following Tuesday, April 30, 1963, but when the 
demonstrators arrived at Bailey's the next evening, Walker 
put a stop to the share-ins. Two men stood at the door and 
restricted entrance into the establishment to white 
customers. The CIP responded by picketing and this became 
the sole form of demonstration available to them once blacks 
could not enter the cafeteria. Even so, the CIP's picketing 
further exposed the restaurant's segregationist policy and 
compounded the publicity and embarrassment of the 
management.15
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The Bailey's episode mushroomed to such a degree that 
Howard W. McKinney, Executive Director of the West Virginia 
Human Rights Commission (WVHRC), summarized Bailey's refusal 
to serve blacks as "giving the whole state a kind of bad 
reputation.1116 McKinney attempted to meet with Walker on
Wednesday, May 1, 1963 to discuss Bailey's policy of not 
serving blacks, but he was unsuccessful in getting a 
meeting. The WVHRC could not very well function to relieve 
racial tensions and promote racial justice if one side 
refused to negotiate. Thus rendered ineffectual, McKinney 
and the WVHRC could not see any alternative and endorsed the 
CIP demonstrations in a statement declaring, "we may 
logically expect that Negroes in West Virginia will protest 
with every means at their command when our efforts and those 
of local human rights commissions bear no evidence of 
f . f 1 . . 1117ru1t u negotiations. 
After their refusal to discuss the matter with McKinney 
led to more picketing by the CIP, Floyd Walker and Sadie B . 
Bailey, co-owners of Bailey's Cafeteria, sought an 
injunction against the CIP and individual protesters to 
"forbid mass or obstructive picketing, any unlawful act to 
prevent the petitioners from conducting their business, or 
blocking of the cafeteria entrance or exit.111
8 Bailey hoped
to have the number of pickets limited, if not completely 
forbidden. Essentially, Walker and Bailey wanted the court 
system to uphold their r1ght not to serve blacks by 
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outlawing the highly visible and embarrassing CIP-led 
demonstrators. The WVHRC termed the petition for an 
injunction "a step backward in race relations," and the CIP 
k . h . k . 19just ept rig t on pie eting. 
At 10 a.m. on Saturday,.May 4, 1963, eleven summoned 
students appeared before Circuit Court Judge John W . 
Hereford and a capacity filled courtroom concerning Walker 
and Bailey's injunction request. Attorney Herbert H. 
Henderson represented the students while Bliss T. Charles 
presented Bailey's case. When Henderson moved for 
additional time to prepare the defendants' case, Judge 
Hereford granted a one week postponement. However, Judge 
Hereford made it clear that justice would be served 
regardless of race. This� in itself, was a victory for the 
student defendants, particularly considering the closed 
legal channels in the South.20
Even more encouraging to the civil rights activists was 
the choice of words used by Judge Hereford to Bailey's 
counsel: 
I can't tell what they [the student defendants] 
are doing that they shouldn't be doing. I can't 
tell why, from this petition, that the plaintiffs, 
Bailey's refuse to serve them. There is nothing 
in this petition that indicates to me why Bailey's 
doesn't serve these people. And I would like to 
know that. Why they picked this part}1ular group 
out and refused to give them service. 
Attorney Charles insisted that the petition had nothing 
to do with segregation practices when he replied to Judge 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
40 
Hereford's query saying that Bailey's "reserved the right to 
serve who they choose ... as a private operator of private 
property.1122 Charles' answer did not appease Judge Hereford
who responded: 
Apparently this is the first time I have heard of 
them exercising their choice. However, I would 
like to drop this thought and it might be helpful 
to both sides. That if this is a problem 0f 
Bailey's refusing to serve Negroes--and I have a 
suspicion that that is what it is--and if they 
refuse to serve Negroes ... because it is a private 
business, say they do have the right, which in my 
way of thinking, is violating the spirit--maybe 
not the letter--but the spirit of the Supreme 
Court decisions of the United Stat2� and_ the 
Constitution of the United States. 
Judge Hereford denounced Bailey's racial discrimination 
and said that although Bailey's as a private business could 
legally practice segregation whereas the federal government 
could not, it could not expect the courts to aid the 
restaurant in its discriminatory practices. He also noted 
that picketing, if it did not obstruct the free flow of the 
sidewalks, was perfectly legal and a matter for the police 
when the law was violated. Judge Hereford then suggested 
that the one week postponement, besides giving the 
defendants adequate time to respond, would also give 
Bailey's an opportunity to reconsider the petition for an 
injunction and at least to provide ample time to amend the 
petition so that it proved the law or somebody's rights had 
been or were being violated. Before adjourning, Judge 
Hereford stipulated that there was to be no violence from 
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either party. As Judge Hereford had alluded earlier in the 
hearing to Henderson, violence on the part of the pickets 
would have forced him to grant the injunction. So, it 
appears the non-violent demonstration by the CIP proved to 
be a practical method of resistatlce in Huntington.24
Certainly, the CIP's actions and Judge Hereford's 
ringing words stirred a variety of responses in Huntington. 
The CIP resumed its picketing of Bailey's. The WVHRC had 
already spoken in favor of the CIP's demonstrations. One 
writer concluded that the CIP's confrontation with Bailey's 
sparked an outpouring of "symbolic·" support for the CIP from 
formerly passive entities. On Friday, May 10, 1964, the 
Huntington City Council went on record as supporting civil 
rights and racial equalitf by officially declaring ''that all 
public or semi-public facilities be open to all persons 
without regard to race, color, or creed," and vowing to work 
toward this end.25
Four days earlier the Huntington ministerial 
Association (HMA) had adopted a similar but more specific 
position: 
... the Ministerial Association of Huntington and 
vicinity deplores the attitude of Bailey's 
Restaurant in denying equal service to certain 
citizens of our community because of their race, 
and the Association urges that the restaurant 
management reconsider and change its policy in the 
light of the Jude26Christian understanding of love for our neighbor. 
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The HMA also went on record supporting the right of the CIP 
to picket. 
Conversely, the Human Rights Commission (HRC) of 
Huntington.never really approved of the CIP's actions. 
Huntington's HRC took the position that the CIP 
demonstrations made its job harder. Members of Huntington's 
HRC had spoken with Floyd Walker before, during, and after 
the CIP's demonstrations, and they much preferred to 
continue with negotiations to resolve the conflict. 
However, the HRC did not totally condemn the CIP's direct 
action tactics. In a May 10, 1963, statement the ijRC 
recognized "the right of groups and individuals to picket 
and use other non-violent methods of protesting various 
forms of discrimination such as refusal to serve Negroes in 
public accommodations.1127 Nevertheless, the Huntington HRC
remained committed to being a conciliatory body, ready to 
moderate negotiations for a settlement. 
These aforementioned bodies all had different 
motivations and varying perceptions, but they all affirmed 
the CIP's right to demonstrate peacefully and expressed 
support for civil rights. Not all Huntingtonians, however, 
shared these sentiments. At a City Council meeting, 
Chauncey R. Crabtree, a long-time patron of Bailey's, spoke 
in favor of the �afeteria's policy of not serving blacks 
because he did not believe the races should mix.28 At one
time Tom Stafford shared Crabtree's conviction, but the 
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former Young Republican had a change of heart concerning 
civil rights and became an ardent CIP activist. This served 
to heighten Stafford's awareness of the discrimination and 
racist attitudes prevailing in Huntington. During the 
protest against Bailey's, Stafford had his dedication tested 
as Bunche Gray related: 
I understand that where he was picketing in 
front of the Bailey's Cafeteria, an old white man 
walked up to him and said, 'Boy, your father would 
turn over in his grave if he knew that you were 
doing this.' Then he backed Tom against one of 
the walls of Bailey's Cafeteria ... and they said 
Tom said, "Yes sir, Yes sir." He didn't say a 
word and he just l�stened to that man berate him 
for doing that, and he kept demonstrating. And 
you know, I couldn't help but appreciate the fact 
that even though the elderly person was telling 
him that he was doing something completely against 
his fat?er's2�ishes ... he believed in us [enough]to continue. 
This anecdote reveals not only Stafford's dedication and 
courage in working with the CIP, but it also shows the 
degree of bigotry and opposition that confronted the CIP 
activists, particularly if the activist was from Huntington, 
as Stafford was. 
As a result of the CIP's actions, a variety of 
responses emerged before the legal showdown on the issue . 
Essentiallly though, the responses can be categorized as 
either sympathetic support (usually non-active), pro-racial 
segregation, and the ever present but incalculable "quiet, 
apathetic majority." Many people quite simply did not want 
to hear about racial discrimination. That is probably why 
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the Huntington Advertiser gave the Bailey's protests no 
coverage and minimal treatment of the legal proceedings, and 
why the general public was basically quiet on the issue.
30
Huntington had a conservative tradition that easily could 
have left most of its citizens with racist attitudes and 
secretly opposed to the CIP's actions. Yet, Huntington 
never fully. admitted to having a race problem, and 
Huntingtonians seemingly tried to bury their collective 
heads and ignore the problem by rationalizing that while 
racial discrimination occurred elsewhere, it did not exist 
in Huntington. Herbert Henderson's perception supports this 
analysis: 
It's difficult to describe how the white 
community felt about the protests in Huntington, 
but my perception was that the pickets were an 
embarrassment and i51everyone ignored them, theywould just go away . 
The legal proceedings, however, could not be ignored. 
By Wednesday, May 8, 1964, attorney Bliss L. Charles 
had filed an amended petition for an injunction against the 
CIP. The amended petition alleged that the CIP had 
intimidated and harassed the management and patrons of 
Bailey's Cafeteria since April 25, 1963. The CIP's actions 
had supposedly blocked the cafeteria's entrance and exit so 
customers had to push bodily through the pickets. Also, 
many customers feared crossing the picket lines to patronize 
the establishment. Consequently, Bailey's lost potential 
revenue and had to dispose of unused food bought to serve 
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the regular number of customers. As a result, Bailey's 
business had been harmed by the CIP's "massive and 
disorderly" picketing and the cafeteria owners requested 
that the Court affirm their right to operate a private 
business and to be able to serve the customers of their 
choice. The amended petition asked the court to prohibit 
picketing unless performed in an orderly fashion and to stop 
the CIP from interferring with the plaintiffs and the 
d f b . 32 con uct o us1ness . 
On the following day, attorney Herbert Henderson filed 
a motion for dismissal which listed the five following 
reasons: 
1. The complaint and affidavits fail to state a
claim against the defendants upon which relief can
be granted.
2. It appears on the face of the complaint that
the plaintiffs ·have full, complete and adequate
remedies at law in that a civil action will be for
recovery of any damages sustained.
3. The plaintiffs allege the commission of
certain crimes for which a warrant could be
obtained and the court cannot enjoin the
commission of a crime.
4. Plaintiff's cafeteria is licensed by the state
and. their [the state's] authority to license a
business for the public use is derived from the
public and the Negro is a part of the public as
well as. whites.
5. This court lacks jurisdiction in that the
state cannot through its judiciary enforce
so-called private discrimination in ��elation of
the state and federal constitutions . 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
46 
The last two points in the dismissal motion were the heart 
of Henderson's case. Point number five hinged on a broad 
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment and was central 
to the civil rights issue nationally. People like Governor 
George Wallace of Alabama argued that the United States 
Constitution did not specifically require that blacks be 
given civil rights. He took the position that states and 
certainly all private concerns such as businessess could 
legally practice segregation. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 
later resolved this issue but for the time being Judge 
Hereford had to make his own decision.34
Saturday, May 11, 1963, was the day of reckoning for 
Bailey's petition for an injunction. The hearing began at 
10 a.m. with Henderson's motion for dismissal the first 
order of business. Judge Hereford denied Henderson's motion 
and five hours of testimony and the cross examination of 
thirteen witnesses ensued. During the testimony, Henderson 
questioned a Bailey's ofricial about the cafeteria's policy 
on serving blacks. Henderson recalled that "he was proud to 
say the cafeteria had never knowingly served a black. And 
he said it with such pride and determination I'll never 
· 113 5 forget it. Floyd Walker stated during the hearing that
the cafeteria's "white only" policy had been in effect since
1934 for the purpose of protecting business. In essence,
Walker and his attorney, Charles, tried to show that
Bailey's had been selective of its customers for quite some
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time. This was the argument supporting Bailey's right, as a 
private business, not to serve blacks.36 
For the rest of the hearing, Charles attempted to 
demonstrate that the presence of the pickets disrupted the 
normal operation of business and created tensions and the 
potential for violence. As proof, Charles called all 
thirteen witnesses. Walker testified that on April 30, 
1963, black and white students entered Bailey's and blocked 
the serving lines. He, and later a police officer, asked 
the students to leave. When they refused, Walker claimed he 
had to close the cafeteria early and lost forty percent of 
its business, or about $350. In another example, Walker 
told of an incident on May 1, 1963, when he stationed two 
male employees at the door to keep out the student 
demonstrators and "two of the students tried to 'body-press 
their way through. 1 1137 Also, a white customer had to
squeeze through the demonstrators on that evening to get 
into the cafeteria. Of the other twelve witnesses called by 
Charles, all concurred that no violence occurred at any time 
during the demonstrations but many of them had been fearful 
of potential violence. One witness called the tension 
packed atmosphere at Bailey's an "explosive situation. 1138
In defense, Henderson countered by arguing that 
Bailey's closed on April 30, 1963, because of its policy, 
not due to the actions of the student demonstrators. 
Henderson's defense hinged upon points four and five in his 
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motion for dismisssal. He contended that the State of West 
Virginia could not license an establishment with a public 
interest such as Bailey's Cafeteria and uphold the exclusion 
of part of the public. Furthermore, Henderson declared in 
his defense statement, "when the state seeks to enforce 
so-called private discrimination, such discrimination 
becomes state action and comes under the scope of the 14th 
d 1139Amen ment .... 
By 4 p.m. the decision had been made. Judge Hereford 
denied Bailey's injunction request on the grounds that 
neither property damage nor violence existed as a basis for 
an injunction . In addition, Judge Hereford noted that 
peaceful picketing was the legal right of all citizens. The 
defendants, however, received a warning to keep their quest 
for civil rights peaceful. As Judge Hereford commented, 
"we don't live in Birmingham, Alabama.1140 Nevertheless,
Judge Hereford did support the concept of civil rights and 
the need for justice for all people, stating: 
The cafeteria has been my favorite eating place 
for years, but if it is a good place for me to eat 
it also is a good place for Negroes to eat. 
This is the Centennial year and we are 
observing the beginning of a state born i� the 
heat of the Civil War. A racial situation like 
this is not conducive to a goS1 reputation for
Huntington or West Virginia." 
Judge Hereford acknowledged that Bailey's petition for 
an injunction was the hardest case he had had to judge in 
his twenty-three years on the bench. Yet, if he had doubt 
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as to the wisdom of his decision, the United States Supreme 
Court soon eased his mind. On May 21, 1963, the Supreme 
Court ruled on seven cases involving sit-in demonstrators 
and determined that "a state or city may not interfer, in 
any fashion, with peaceful racial integration sit-in 
demonstrations in public places of business.1142 This
decision struck down laws and ordinances forbidding peaceful 
sit-in demonstrations and prohibited state and municipal 
officials from taking actions or making statements which 
encouraged establishment� not to serve blacks. Though 
stemming from the 1960 lunch counter sit-ins, the Supreme 
Court decision had relevance in Huntington in 1963. Judge 
Hereford's decision now had the backing of the United States 
Supreme Court. So long as the demonstrations remained 
peaceful, Bailey's and other Huntington establishments had 
no legal recourse. Help in defending the segregationist 
policies of private businesses was not forthcoming from 
municipal or state government or from the courts . 
Proprietors could still technically refuse to serve blacks 
on their own, but as a dissenting Supreme Court Justice 
declared, it "has certainly become a greatly diluted right, 
if it has not indeed, been totally destroyed.1143 This 
Supreme Court decision reinforced the CIP's legal victory in 
the Bailey's case . 
In Huntington, thereafter, every establishment could 
legally be peacefully protested by the CIP or any other 
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groups or individuals for not catering to blacks. Civil 
rights and integration efforts in Huntington had been given 
a boost. As for Bailey's, integration loomed as inevitable . 
Sincere negotiations between several Huntington ministers, 
Huntington's HRC, the CIP and Bailey's management took place 
after Judge Hereford's ruling. In less than a week the 
concerned parties reached an agreement for a quiet, gradual 
integration of Bailey's Cafeteria. In the first phase, 
Reverend Royce McDonald, a representative on Huntington's 
HRC, accompanied Reverend Charles Smith into Bailey's for 
the first meal to be eaten in the cafeteria by a black 
person under integrated circumstances. The second phase 
called for a two week period of serving a small number of 
black customers. After the two week period any and all 
blacks wanting to patronize the restaurant could do so.44 
Through this plan, Bailey's began serving black and 
white customers together. However, as Carter related, the 
CIP resented having black and white community leaders take 
over negotiations, declare victory, and essentially tell the 
CIP to go away: 
... well, we've used these students enough, they've 
done enough. Now you all retire and let us 
sophisticated folks take over and negotiate all of 
this because you don't understand a damn thing 
[about] power. That was very painful and all of 
us [CIP activists] resented it. And it was 
deliberate and it was calculated to bring in what 
we considered as 'a new black middle class.' that 
was a responsible middle class that was really 
created as a direct result of the pain and the 
risks the students took. And certain students 
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were included in that new class and
4§
here were
· certain students who were excluded. 
Carter was not a part of the "new black middle class." 
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In any case, the struggle to integrate Bailey's was a 
complete victory for the CIP, but the black CIP activists 
did not feel victorious. Carter explained that "most of the 
time we kept our true opinions to ourselves because we were 
afraid it would really frighten other people if they really 
knew how much we dete�ted what was going on. And very, very 
candidly detested the fact that we had to do it! 1146
Nevertheless, the GIP had to push for civil rights. The 
need existed and the time had come. 
The direct non-violent tactics of the CIP had worked 
beautifully and seemed to be the key to unlocking 
Huntington's segregated establishments. Many GIP activists, 
including Mary T. Hall, believed that only direct action 
tactics would led to success: 
In the 20 years that I have lived in Huntington, I 
have found negotiation to be, in the majority of 
cases, of little value. It is my opinion that a 
demonstration would be more effective in breaking 
discriminatory practice!7by certain establishmentsin the Huntington area. 
The GIP had done just that, and proved Hall correct in her 
assessment. By forcing the management of Bailey's Cafeteria 
to deal with the issue of civil rights, integration 
successfully resulted. Even Reverend Royce McDonald later 
acknowledged that only the pressure exerted by the CIP 
forced Bailey's to integrate. The GIP activists had been 
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the galvanizing force to bring about positive change; they 
had brought the civil rights storm to Huntington. However, 
h . . . h d . b 48 t e resistance to 1ntegrat1on a Just egun . 
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Chapter IV 
Bigoted Resistance 
Racial discrimination in Huntington had been dealt a 
crippling blow with the integration of Bailey's Cafeteria, 
but bigotry had not been swept away. Racism soon reared its 
ugly head once again in the person of Roba Quesenberry, 
owner of the White Pantry Restaurant. Because of his 
actions to resist the CIP's integration efforts, the White 
Pantry came to symbolize bigotry in Huntington. The issues 
of racial discrimination and civil rights had just begun to 
subside after the integration of Bailey's when the CIP 
stirred them anew. 
The controversy surrounding the White Pantry began 
during an interracial dance. In 1963, interracial dances 
represented the latest attempts at social integration. Many 
of the interracial dances in Huntington were held at a dance 
hall in the nine hundred block of Fifth Avenue, near the 
White Pantry Restaurant. One night early in the summer at 
such a dance with the Parliaments, an all black band, 
playing live music, a young black woman who was hot and 
thirsty, walked down from the dance hall to the White 
Pantry. Though she was willing to pay and abide by whatever 
restrictions the White Pantry had on serving blacks, the 
restaurant promptly denied this young woman a cold drink. 
Her resultant frustration and humiliation �pread throughout 
the black community like wildfire.1
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The White Pantry had been marked as a practitioner of 
discrimination by the CIP's March 1963 discrimination study 
reported to MU's student government. Nothing had changed at 
the White Pantry since then despite the CIP's successful 
integration of Bailey's. Now the White Pantry openly 
refused to serve blacks, and the CIP could not, and did not, 
ignore this slap in the face. 
On July 13, 1963, the CIP struck at the White Pantry 
with a share-in demonstration. Direct evidence of what 
happened at this first demonstration does not exist. 
However, Phil Carter mentioned this first encounter at the 
White Pantry in his testimony at a September 1963 hearing of 
Quesenberry's petition for an injunction. Carter recounted 
that twenty-five CIP-led demonstrators entered the 
�estaurant and sat down to be served. The waitresses 
informed the black demonstrators they would not be served 
and proceeded to take orders from the ten to twelve white 
demonstrators present. After the white demonstrators got 
their food, they invited their black counterparts to share 
in the meal. This action by the demonstrators was not 
tolerated. Carter later testified that one employee "began 
picking up every dish a Negro touched and slamming it to the 
floor and breaking it.112 After watching this display, the 
share-in participants quietly exited the restaurant . 
News of the CIP's encounter with the White Pantry 
spread across the state, and students from other West 
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Virginia colleges, particularly from the predominately black 
West Virginia State College, approached the CIP about 
joining in the demonstrations or helping in other ways . 
Eventually, Concord, Bluefield and West Virginia State 
Colleges all had a subsiantial number of student activists 
claiming membership in the CIP, and many of these student 
activists, particularly from West Virginia State College, 
often participated in CIP demonstrations at the White 
Pantry. As a result, the CIP received a great deal of 
3support from college students. 
The West Virginia State connection became more evident 
in the second protest of the White Pantry. On July 27, 
1963, the CIP-led student demonstrators from MU and West 
Virginia State College met determined resistance. When the 
protesters entered the White Pantry to begin a sit-in, 
Quesenberry had the employees begin mopping with an ammonia 
cleaning solution. Next, an insecticide was set off within 
the restaurant and the air conditioning was turned off and 
the heating system turned on. The demonstrators withstood 
about one hour under these conditions by placing 
water-soaked handkerchiefs, handed to them from picketing 
compatriots outside the restaurant, over their faces. 
Quesenberry closed the White Pantry and forced the 
demonstrators to leave. Later that day the 24 hour 
4 restaurant reopened . 
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Unlike Bailey's Cafeteria, the White Pantry under 
Quesenberry ignored the unfavorable publicity and pressure 
exerted by the CIP and fellow demonstrators from West 
Virginia State College, the Huntington chapter of the NAACP 
and sympathetic citizens.5 Verbal and physical abuse
characterized Quesenberry's early and future resistance to 
the CIP'.s integration efforts. Both sides were ready and 
willing to carry out a determined and prolonged struggle. 
A third day of sit-in demonstrations at White Pantry 
took place on Saturday August 3, 1963. Between 1:30 p.m. 
and 2:30 p.m., twenty-three black and two white students 
staged a sit-in inside the restaurant with a line of pickets 
outside. Typically, Quesenberry turned off the air 
conditioning, turned on the heating system and burned 
sulphur and insecticide cakes. The demonstrators used 
surgical masks but the fumes still effected them. This 
demonstration marked the first evidence of personal violence 
against the activists. As a black female demonstrator 
attempted to enter the White Pantry, Quesenberry pushed her 
back.6 
The protests, however, were not over for that day . 
Quite uncharacteristically, the CIP led another round of 
sitting-in and picketing at the White Pantry between 7:30 
and 8:30 that same evening. Quesenberry once again replaced 
the air conditioning with heat, and lit sulphur and 
insecticide cakes. Physical violence did not occur this 
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time; perhaps because a squad of six police officers watched 
.the proceedings with over 100 onlookers. Afterwards, 
Quesenberry told the media he would not serve blacks for 
fear of losing his white customers. Quesenberry maintained 
this position despite the demonstrations and discussions 
with representatives from the state and city human rights 
commissions. Howard W. McKinney, Executive Director of the 
West Virginia Human Rights Commission (WVHRC), confirmed the 
finality of Quesenberry's position by saying, "he wouldn't 
serve Negroes unless there was a law that compelled him to 
do so.117 Quesenberry was going to resist every step of the
way . 
Despite Quesenberry's dogmatic attitude, however, the 
CIP and fellow activists remained dedicated to the cause. 
In order to ste� up the rate of demonstrations, the CIP 
organized a demonstration at the White Pantry for 4:30 p.m., 
Thursday August 8. However, the demonstration must not have 
been a surprise to Quesenberry. As five black youths, ages 
14 to 20, picketed outside the White Pantry and fifteen to 
twenty demonstrators began a sit-in, Quesenberry turned all 
customers away, waited twenty minutes to clear out the 
remaini�g diners, and closed the restaurant with a sign that 
read: "Closed for Cleaning Walls." He then lit an 
insecticide flare and set it in the center aisle of the 
dining area where the demonstrators sat. In moments the 
restaurant cleared as the fumes proved to be too powerful to 
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withstand. One female demonstrator, Helen Willis, a West 
Virginia State College student who was staying with an aunt 
in Huntington for the summer, collapsed on the sidewalk just 
outside the White Pantry's doors as a result of the fumes. 
With tears streaming down her face, she gasped for air to 
clear her lungs of the noxious vapors. By the time a taxi 
cab arrived, Willis had r�cuperated somewhat and was sent 
home by her friends. Though not seriously injured, the 
incident with Willis escalated the tension in Huntington and 
stiffened the resolve of the CIP activists and their 
8cohorts. 
Two days later on Saturday, August 10, a group of 48 
blacks and three whites participated in another 
demonstration at the White Pantry. This time, however, 
Quesenberry resorted to a new tactic; he closed and locked 
the restaurant's doors before any of the demonstrators could 
enter. When a white patron left the restaurant, however, 
the door was temporarily left open and unguarded. Four 
black demonstrators managed to enter the White Pantry before 
Quesenberry and two other white males secured the door and 
prevented the other demonstrators from coming into the 
establishment. Shortly thereafter, Quesenberry permitted 
three police officers to enter and he told them he was 
temporarily closing the restaurant. The police officers 
overcame their typical passivity and asked the black 
demonstrators to leave the premises. The four demonstrators 
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peacefully complied with the request. Once outside, these 
four joined their compatriots in singing hymns, clapping 
their hands, and marching through downtown Huntington . 
Meanwhile, the White Pantry reopened. But, upon the 
demonstrators return to the restaurant, Quesenberry quickly 
reclosed his establishment. For the next two and a half 
hours the demonstrators picketed and sang outside the White 
9Pantry. 
The police left after a while and white teenage 
onlookers jeered and physically harassed the demonstrators. 
In one incident a white teenager attempted to set fire to 
one protester's sign with a match. Quesenberry's resistance 
had seemingly rallied several bigoted white youths into 
opposing the CIP-led demonstrators with a potential.for 
violence far greater than Quesenberry's. own personal abuse . 
The summer heat of August only mimicked the seething racial 
tensions and potentially violent atmosphere that boiled in 
Huntington with the White Pantry at the center of the 
vortex. Budd Moser, a member of Huntington's City Council 
and spectator at the August 10th protest, voiced what many 
Huntingtonians began to sense when he called the conditions 
surrounding the White Pantry an "explosive situation.1110
Moser and the other City Council members quickly 
decided to try to ease the tension by voting unanimously at 
a meeting on Monday, August 12, to make the City Council a 
committee to facilitate the efforts of Huntington's Huma11 
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�ight Commission (HRC) to resolve the situation. The 
Council rejected the pleas of Phil Carter and Bunche Gray to 
take firmer action. For some reason, the Council concluded 
that it could not take legal action to outlaw segregation or 
in any way force Quesenberry to integrate. But the Council 
expressed willingness to be a mediating body, and met with 
Quesenberry in a ninety minute closed meeting on Wednesday, 
August 14 at the Hotel Frederick. The meeting was closed to 
the public and to the CIP because Quesenberry would not 
discuss the issue with blacks. Members of the City Council 
and Huntington's HRC attempted to convince Quesenberry to 
alter his policy of not serving blacks at the White Pantry, 
but this one-sided mediation process ended without 
11success. 
The next day the Council released a statement which 
promoted optimism that "an honorable and peaceable 
settlement" would be found to resolve the situation. Yet, 
Quesenberry remained resolute in not serving blacks unless 
required to do so by law, and the CIP had already called for 
a demonstration for Saturday, August 17. Gus Cleckley, 
President of the Huntington Chapter of the NAACP, failed to 
see the value of negotiations and declared, "Negotiations 
are not necessary. The matter is quite simple. If 
Quesenberry changes his policy, we will stop our 
demonstrations. If he does not, we will continue.1112
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The protests continued despite Mayor George Garner's 
attempt to call a truce. Quesenberry held firm in not 
changing his policy on serving blacks and the CIP and 
assorted groups refused to cancel the upcoming August 17 
demonstration. The forty minute demonstration was peaceful 
as about 350 spectators, 50 police officers, and an unknown 
number of plainclothes detectives inside and outside the 
White Pantry watched the proceedings. Fifty-three pickets, 
including four whites, marched along the sidewalk in front 
of the White Pantry, clapping their hands and singing 
religious and patriotic songs. Quesenberry did not close 
the restaurant, but rather, stationed doorkeepers to permit 
white customer's exit and entry and to keep out all blacks. 
After concluding their pr�test, the demonstrators paraded 
north on Ninth Street to Fourth Avenue and dispersed from 
there.13 
The CIP activists and their NAACP allies fulfilled 
their committment to staging a demonstration, and the public 
announcement of the demonstration focused further attention 
on the White Pantry issue. Though Quesenberry had to behave 
himself, the protesters could do nothing more than picket . 
Quesenberry undoubtedly had the law on his side and would 
have had the demonstrators arrested on trespassing and other 
assorted charges if they had tried to sit-in or have a 
share-in. Si, the CIP and NAACP quietly picketed and reaped 
further favorable publicity on the issue. The demonstrators 
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displayed the qualities of dignity, respectability and 
non-violence while asking for nothing more than justice and 
equality. Quesenberry, like his southern counterparts, had 
already developed a tarnished media and public i�age because 
he resorted to vidlent tactics. This is why approximately 
350 spectators and dozens of police officers were present at 
the August 17th White Pantry demonstration. Though the 
police would surely have arrested the demonstrators, the 
objective of Huntington's political and business leaders was 
to maintain the peace and everybody knew Quesenberry was 
prone to violent acts. Yet, even with this increasing 
public awareness of Quesenberry's bigoted serving policies 
and public castigation for his contemptible role, he refused 
. ld 14to y1e 
Quesenberry had plenty of white customers, especially 
R.M. Hoisington, Huntington's City Manager, to back his
position. The City Council had gone on record as opposing
city employees frequenting establishments that practiced
racial discrimination. Nevertheless, Hoisington continued
to eat at the White Pantry, and although he received harsh
criticism at the August 26th meeting of the City Council,
he ardently defended his right to eat where he wanted,
ironically a right often denied to blacks in Huntington.15
City Council soon began to realize that it was 
incapable of resolving the specific problem ·with the White 
Pantry and the general need for civil rights legislation . 
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At a special meeting on Monday, August 19, the City Council 
reiterated its inability or unwillingness "to pioneer in 
civil rights legislation." The Council did, however, go on 
record with a resolution urging ''the state and federal 
governments to adopt legislation without delay that will 
provide the framework in which equal rights can be 
accomplished and guaranteed.1116 The resolution further 
stated that the City Council was willing to work with all 
groups in seeking equality and civil rights. In essence, 
this was all the City Council believed it could do. 
Technically, Quesenberry remained within his legal right not 
to serve blacks, and Council was not about to go out on a 
limb and pass an ordinance outlawing discriminatory 
practices. The issue had grown larger than the Council 
could or would willingly handle.17
The CIP, however, attempted to force Huntington's City 
Council to take positive action. At a Council meeting on 
August 26th protestors from the CIP and the NAACP made 
allegations that the Huntington police and fire departments 
and the Cabell-Huntington Health Department failed to act 
properly concerning the White Pantry. In particular, health 
and fire codes and city ordinances had not been enforced by 
the named agencies. The Council authorized Mayor Garner to 
create an investigation team to look into the charges . 
Clearly, this was a clever attempt by the CIP and its allies 
to pressure the city to force· Quesenberry to change his 
,. /, • ' ' ; .:i 
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policy. As one The Herald Dispatch article correctly 
analyzed: 
In effect representatives of the Civic 
Interest Progressives and the National Association 
for the Advancement of Colored People asked the 
city administration to use its powers to bring the 
White Pantry management into. submission on the 
18issue of serving all persons regardless of race. 
67 
The city spurned the opportunity to take a positive 
role when a report by interim City Manager James F. White 
absolved the police, fire, and health departments of laxity 
charges. No legal injustices had occurred and the city 
apparently did not want to use these agencies to correct 
social injustices. The CIP and the NAACP termed White's 
report a "whitewash." Mayor Garner did say the city would 
investigate any allegations brought to the attention of the 
City Manager or any appropriate city department. The 
protestors wanted the appropriate officials available for 
on-the-spot checks of the White Pantry. The best the city 
would do was to have officials at the scene of a 
demonstration, if given ample warning. This could not be 
done because Quesenberry would then find out about the 
demonstration and close the restaurant's doors. The City 
Council had effectively avoided taking an active stand in 
the White Pantry case or on the civil rights issue. More 
than words were necessary. Consequently, the CIP would have 
to get help elsewhere.19
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Meanwhile, Quesenberry ushered in the next phase of the 
White Pantry dispute when, for the first time, he had 
demonstrators arrested. On Saturday, August 24th, members 
of the CIP and NAACP started a sit-in at 12:45 p.m. while 
four picketers marched outside the restaurant. About twenty 
demonstrators remained within the establishment until 3:25 
p.m. when a fumigant, released by Quesenberry, drove the
protesters out. The sit-in demonstration resumed five 
minutes later after Quesenberry left the door unguarded 
which permitted the protestors' reentry. Shortly 
thereafter, Quesenberry used two "John Doe" (no specific 
name) warrants for trespassing and had Gustavus Cleckley, 
President of the Huntington Branch of the NAACP, and Cicero 
Fain, Jr., a member of the CIP executive committee, 
arrested. Between 4 p.m. and 6 p.m. Cleckley and Fain were 
formally charged and processed by the police. After posting 
$500 personal property bonds, both left the police station 
with a hearing on the charges against them scheduled before 
Magistrate Keith Fulton at 2:00 p.m. on Friday, August 30. 
Meanwhile, Cleckley and Fain's compatriots back at the White 
Pantry placed wet towels and clothes over their faces in an 
attempt to stave off the fumes, but by 4:10 p.m. the last of 
the demonstrators staggered out of the restaurant coughing 
20 and teary eyed . 
The arrests escalated the next day as demonstrators 
participated in a noon-hour sit-in. Quesenberry swore out 
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warrants that named Phil Carter, Michael Peters, Thomas 
McGhee, Jr., Barbara Jean Bailey, Josephine Banks, and a 
seventeen year old juvenile with trespassing. Police led 
the six demonstrators on their three block walk to the 
police station to be booked. A parade of protestors 
carrying signs followed the arrested demonstrators to the 
police station and marched outside the Seventh Street 
entrance to the jail. Of the six arrested for trespassing 
only Carter wore handcuffs because the arresting officers 
determined sufficient resistance on Carter's part. While 
the six were being booked on the trespassing charges, Paul 
Duff, a short order cook for the White Pantry restaurant, 
obtained warrants charging Carter and Cicero Fain, Jr. with 
assault and battery. Duff alleged that Carter and Fain 
pushed him against a door which cut his back.21
After posting bond and receiving a September 5, 1963, 
hearing date with Magistrate Johnny Miller, the 
demonstrators returned to the White Pantry in time to 
witness Fain's arrest on Duff's warrant. Soon afterwards, 
Carter released a written statement in conjunction with the 
NAACP telling their version of the day's events. The 
statement accused the police of excessive use of force and 
criticized the magistrates for issuing the warrants. The 
statement concluded with an announcement of a mass meeting 
to be held later that evening. About fifty people attended 
the mass meeting at the Eighteenth Street Methodist Church 
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to discuss what should be done concerning ·the White Pantry 
situation. Ultimately, the people at the meeting decided to 
continue the demonstrations at the White Pantry.22
Shortly after the meeting, fifty people picketed the 
White Pantry while three demonstrators who managed to get 
inside before Quesenberry could lock the doors, sat quietly 
inside the restaurant. The protesters sang and chanted 
while two police officers and several spectators stood by. 
When the City Council began its meeting at 8 p.m., most of 
the demonstrators left the White Pantry to attend the 
meeting and the remaining protesters soon followed. These 
CIP and NAACP demonstrators went to the City Council meeting 
to "focus attention" and urge the Council to do something 
about the White Pantry situation, but this "audience 
participation" yielded nothing. Council had already stated 
its position. After the City Council meeting adjourned, the 
demonstrators returned to picket the White Pantry until 
about 10:30 p.m. Despite being the third demonstration in 
seven hours, all was peaceful. However, the increased 
number of demonstrations probably signified the frustration 
of the demonstrators. Quesenberry had found a new tactic by 
using the legal system to his advantage to frustrate the CIP 
and NAACP's integration efforts at the White Pantry.23
The structure· of the legal battle, however, quickly 
changed when on Thursday, August 29 two events took place. 
First, the Cabell County Prosecutors' Office asked for and 
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received a postponement of the hearing on the trespassing 
and assault and battery charges so a thorough study of the 
law could be made. Also, the delay gave Prosecutor Russell 
C. Dunbar a chance to clear his workload involving the fall
term grand jury session of the Cabell County Pleas Court. 
The delay in prosecuting the criminal charges against the 
seven demonstrators shifted attention to the second event of 
August 29. Quesenberry retained the services of Quinlan, 
Nelson and Williamson and petitioned for a temporary 
injunction to forbid mass demonstrations, limit picketing, 
and assure orderly conduct and the safety of employees of 
the White Pantry restaurant. The petition listed Gustavus 
Cleckley, Philip Carter, Cicero Fain, Jr., Josephine Banks, 
Barbara Jean Bailey, Michael Peters, Thomas McGhee, Jr., the 
CIP and the NAACP as the respondents. A hearing was 
scheduled for Tuesday, September 3, before Circuit Court 
Judge John W. Hereford. Essentially, the setting and case 
were exactly the same as in the Bailey's Cafeteria 
injunction denial less than four months prior. As in the 
Bailey's case, attorney Herbert H. Henderson moved for a 
temporary delay for additional time to prepare the 
respondents' answer and defense. Judge Hereford granted 
Henderson's motion and moved the hearing to Friday, 
September 6, 1963. After being adjourned, Henderson 
immediately went to work with James Gipson, his co-counsel 
in the case, collecting affidavits and statements.24
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By Friday, Henderson and Gipson were ready to fight 
Quesenberry's injunction request and Judge Hereford settled 
in for two days of testimony. Attorneys J.J.N. Quinlan and 
Hiram Williamson presented their client's case during the 
first day by calling eight witnesses: Roba K. Quesenberry, 
owner of the White Pantry, Frank Childers, cook and 
assistant manager of the White Pantry, Zella Mays, a former 
waitress at the White Pantry, John Foster, Huntington 
Publishing Company photographer, Brook Davis, truck driver 
for the General Highway service, James Barcus, truck driver 
for a local meat packing firm, Sam McClain, an unemployed 
construction worker, and Constable Lester Noel. These 
witnesses attempted to show that the demonstrators had 
caused detrimental harm to Quesenberry and the White Pantry 
restaurant. Quesenberry testified to having suffered a $300 
loss for July and a $500 loss for August because of the 
demonstrations. His own surveys indicated that his 
customers would stop patronizing the White Pantry if 
Quesenberry served blacks. Consequently, Quesenberry 
submitted he had had to close his restaurant on several 
occasions. The six other witnesses besides Constable Noel 
alluded to instances where the demonstrators allegedly 
blocked the sidewalk, entrance and bar stools, had attempted 
to enter the 24 hour restaurant after it had closed, and 
practiced disorderly conduct by pulling napkins from 
dispensers and spraying catsup and mustard. Constable 
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Noel's testimony centered upon his arrest of the 
demonstrators on trespass warrants. At one point Judge 
Hereford queried, "Do I understand you to say you served 
trespassing warrants while the restaurant was locked and 
those inside couldn't get out?" Constable Noel replied that 
the door was open at the time of the arrests, but "gas" 
[sulfur and insecticide fumes] pervaded the restaurant.25
References such as Constable Noel's term "gas" were far 
more specific in the testimony of the others concerning 
Quesenberry's actions toward the demonstrators. Before 
burning sulfur, Quesenberry stated that he always warned the 
demonstrators and used the substance only when nobody else 
was in the establishment. Quesenberry added that he only 
used insecticides when necessary. Either atLorney Henderson 
or Gipson asked, "When do-you think they are necessary?" 
Quesenberry coldly replied, "To get rid of insects." In 
short, blacks were no better than bothersome insects to 
26Quesenberry 
Childers' testimony revealed his and Quesenberry's 
disdain for blacks. Childers stated he had blocked the 
entrance on several occasions to prevent blacks from 
entering, and acknowledged that Quesenberry lit sulfur, set 
off insecticides, and had employees mop with an ammonia 
cleaner as tactics to drive the demonstrators out of the 
White Pantry. Neither Childers nor Mays condemned the 
restaurant's policy of not serving blacks. Mays declared 
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she had been instructed not to serve blacks. Childers 
readily confirmed Mays' testimony .and stated the 
restaurant's policy was not to serve blacks. Attorney 
Gipson then asked Childers if the demonstrators' dress had 
anything to do with this policy. With blunt honesty 
Childers replied, "No, it was because of the color of their k, 112 7 s in. 
At the end of the testimonies on the petitioner's 
behalf, attorneys Henderson and Gipson asked Judge Hereford 
to dismiss Quesenberry's petition for an injunction on three 
grounds. First, the petitioner failed to prove the 
defendents irreparably damaged Quesenberry or the White 
Pantry. Second, blacks are American citizens; therefore, 
they are a part of the th� general public. As members of 
the general public, trespassing in a public establishment 
during business hours (the White Pantry was open 24 hours a 
day) was ridiculous. Third, Quesenberry was attempting to 
use "a court of law to enforce his own private convictions." 
Attorneys Quinlan and Williamson opposed the respondents 
motion for dismissal contending the case was a matter of 
private property rights, not civil rights.28
The next• morning Judge Hereford ruled against the 
motion for dismissal and sat back to hear the testimony of 
five witnesses for the respondents and rebuttal testimony by 
Quesenberry. Phil Carter, the first witness to testify, 
told of three acts of violence Quesenberry allegedly 
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committed. In the first incident, Carter testified that on 
July 27, 1963, a sulphur candle fell over. Quesenberry must 
have thought Lawrence Williams, a black demonstrator and 
student from Howard University who had ties with West 
Virginia State College students, knocked the candle over. 
As a result, Quesenberry forcefully grabbed Williams, 
dragged him across the counter, placed a "large butcher 
knife" against his chest, and ordered Williams to pick up 
the sulphur candle. As Carter testified: 
. "Williams offered no resistance and I was 
afraid to say anything for fear he (Quesenberry) 
would apply pressure on the knife. I'm reasonably 
sure he could have
2�
njured Mr. Williams if he had
applied pressure." 
Carter then recalled a second incident where 
Quesenberry pulled Neal Shahan, a white instructor at an 
Annapolis, Maryland high school with residences in Nitro and 
Huntington, West Virginia, off a stool and beat Shahan's 
head against a steel railing. Shahan offered no resistance 
and climbed back upon a stool. Infuriated, Quesenberry 
punched Shahan square on the jaw. In a third incident 
Carter told of Quesenberry beating and dragging 
demonstrators by the hair from the White Pantry on August 
17, 1963. In subsequent testimony Georgeanna Higgins stated 
that Quesenberry had grabbed her by the hair. In rebuttal 
testimony Quesenberry denied ever pulling anybody's hair and 
he contended that the incident with Williams never took 
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Gus Cleckley and Reverend Harry A. Coleman in their 
testimonies both attested to being denied service at the 
White Pantry, while Mayor Garner provided further evidence 
of Quesenberry's racial discriminatory practices. Garner 
recounted futile attempts he and members of the City Council 
and Huntington's Human Rights Commission (HRC) made to 
persuade Quesenberry to integrate his restaurant. At one 
such meeting on August 14, Quesenberry refused even to enter 
the room where negotiations were to take place because one 
of the HRC representitives was a black male.31
By three p.m. Judge Hereford had heard enough testimony 
and called for concluding iemarks. After hearing closing 
arguments, Judge Hereford denied Quesenberry's petition for 
an injunction. In his decision, Judge Hereford ringingly 
condemned Quesenberry's petition and racial bigotry. 
Chapter IV Appendix) Judge Hereford simply refused to 
(See 
accept the argument of Quesenberry's attorneys who contended 
that the White Pantry was private property and as such 
Quesenberry could operate it as he saw fit. Judge.Hereford 
did not see the restaurant in that light. According to his 
interpretation, the White Pantry operated as a semi-public 
establishment since the state licensed the restaurant and 
officials from state or municipal government agencies 
provided regular inspections. Therefore, the White Pantry 
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had to abide by the rules governing all public facilities, 
not as a private establishment. Consequently, blacks, being 
a part of the general public, could not be denied service at 
32the White Pantry. 
Judge Hereford legally found no grounds for the 
injunction. The petitioner never proved the allegations 
against the demonstrators. On the charge of obstructing 
sidewalk traffic and blocking the entrance to the White 
Pantry, Judge Hereford determined the allegation to be 
unjustifiable because the police, present at every 
demonstration, never found sufficient cause to make arrests. 
Quesenberry had also alleged that the demonstrators 
attempted to enter the restaurant en masse after the 
establishment had closed. Yet, according to the evidence, 
the demonstrators always entered the building legally 
through an open door. The most serious of Quesenberry's 
accusations was that the demonstrators grieviously harmed 
the business of the White Pantry. Quesenberry had cited 
heavy financial losses. However, Judge Hereford once again 
ruled in favor of the respondents. The judge concluded that 
Quesenberry brought the damage of his business upon himself: 
. .. I think the evidence clearly demonstrates that 
the petitioner closed his restaurant voluntarily. 
Nobody made· him do it. When the demonstrators 
came in -- American citizens, if you please -­
because he didn't like the c��or of their skin he
attempted to clo?e the door . 
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Because he found no evidence of violence or property damage 
on the part of the demonstrators, Judge Hereford could not 
legally justify Quesenberry's request for an injunction . 
This decision exemplified justice and the spirit of the 
law . As Judge Hereford, himself, noted: 
. . . a court has to sit in a case such as this as a 
court of conscience, a court of the heart, and 
weigh not necessarily according to the cold 
principles of law that the law side requires, but 
according to the heart and soul and conscience of 
the c��ncellor who presides over the trial of the 
case . 
Hereford's heart and sense of justice went to the CIP, 
NAACP, and the individual respondents in this case. 
As in the Bailey's Cafeteria case, Judge Hereford 
a sharp warning against violence. This time, however, 
the 
gave 
Judge 
Hereford directed the bulk of the warning towards 
Quesenberry. The demonstrators had heeded Judge Hereford's 
previous warning and bravely acted in a respectable, 
non-violent fashion. Judge Hereford took notice of this 
fact: 
And so far as I could see every one of them were 
passively resistant. They did a great deal 
better, perhaps, than most people, because it is 
apparent they were trained. They were trained in 
carrying on this kind of a situation and handling 
this kind of situation. And I would look a long 
time to find a greater number of indignities 
inflicted than were inflicted on them in that 
restaurant, the White Pantry .... 
But the sit-inners were non-violent, altho�§h 
indignity after indignity was heaped upon them . 
Phil Carter, in his testimony, had alluded to the 
demonstrators' non-violent training and their dedication to 
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this principle. Quesenberry's violent tendencies, however, 
were well documented. So, Judge Hereford cautioned the 
demonstrators to remain non-violent, and warned Quesenberry 
k h . t 
. . 1 36 not to provo e t em 1n o reactionary v10 ence. 
Though Judge Hereford's decision publicly scolded 
Quesenberry for his segregationist policies and racist 
attitudes, a law forcing him to integrate the White Pantry 
did not exist. Realizing.this, the CIP had already begun to 
pressure West Virginia Governor William Wallace Barron to 
issue an executive order forbidding racial discrimination in 
all establishments having dealings with state agencies. 
This would include any establishment which required 
licenses, food permits, and Health Department inspection, 
and would legally force places of public accommodations to 
integrate, and virtually eliminate racial segregation 
Such an executive proclamation would carry the legal weight 
necessary to compel Quesenberry to serve blacks. 
On August 9, 1963, Governor Barron hinted that he might 
issue an anti-discrimination order. This vague suggestion 
did not indicate what the executive order might cover .
Basically, Governor Barron attempted to ease increasing 
racial tensions by temporarily pacifying black agitators in 
Bluefield and Huntington. In Bluefield, the NAACP had 
threatened to boycott all establishments practicing racial 
segregation. Meanwhile, news of the sit-in demonstrations 
at the White Pantry had rapidly spread across the state. 
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The issue of civil rights was growing within West Virginia's 
37 
borders. 
Eleven days later on August 20 the CIP, along with the 
NAACP and ministers and students from the Huntington and 
Charleston area, brought the civil rights· issue a little 
closer to Governor Barron's attention. Approximately 100 
demonstrators protested segregation policies practiced and 
supported by most of the governors, especially George 
Wallace (Alabama), Ross Barnett (Mississippi), and Orville 
Faubus (Arkansas), who attended the 29th annual meeting of 
the Southern Governors' Convention held at the Greenbrier 
Resort in White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia. However, 
the demonstration also had the effect of putting Governor 
Barron on the spot. He met the demonstrators at the gate of 
the Greenbrier and told them he supported President John F . 
Kennedy's civil rights bill and promised to issue an 
executive order banning racial discrimination. Later, in 
his resort suite, Governor Barron indicated the executive 
order would go as far as West Virginia's constitution and 
laws permitted. Satisfied, the CIP activists and other 
demonstrators left the Greenbrier convinced they would 
receive what they so desperately wanted and needed.38
The CIP did not hear from Governor Barron again until 
October 1, 1963, when he requested a meeting with the CIP . 
Three officers represented the CIP: Philip Carter, chair; 
Gloria Austin, executive; and Pat Austin, executive 
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secretary. Accompanying them were Gustavus Cleckly, 
president of the Huntington chapter of the NAACP; Dr. Paul 
Stewart, professor of political science; Reverend Harry 
Coleman of Ebenezer Methodist Church; Albert Calloway, 
president of the West Virginia State College student body; 
Mrs. Virgil Gilmore, president of the Charleston branch of 
Congress of Racial Equality (CORE); and attorney James 
Gipson, legal redress chair of the Huntington branch of the 
NAACP. For two hours, these civil rights leaders met with 
Governor Barron and urged him to issue an executive order 
which, according to Carter, would require "all 
state-licensed businesses providing accommodation services 
for the public to serve all persons without distinction.1139
Due to the "off-the-record" nature of their discussion with 
Governor Barron, the civil rights activists did not make a 
statement. But, when Governor Barron announced that an 
executive order would be forthcoming in the near future, 
though still without revealing specific content, the CIP and 
other civil rights activists went home anticipating a 
sweeping victory for civil rights in West Virginia.4O
Unfortunately, for the activists, the ensuing result 
was disappointing. On October 17, 1963, Governor Barron 
released his promised excutive order. It was a repetition 
of an executive order he released in January 1962, 
prohibiting racial discrimination in employment by all state 
agencies. The new order did not mention public 
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accommodations and in no way attacked segregation policies 
in establishments having dealings with the state. Reverend 
Charles H. Smith of the First Baptist Church in Huntington 
critiqued the executive order as the culmination of Governor 
Barron's delaying tactics: "Promises have been used for 
public performances and procrastination had been used as a 
catalytic weapon to slow down the ambition of those wanting 
1 
. 
lk f 1. f 1141equa treatment 1n every wa o 1 e. ,Seemingly, 
Reverend Smith was correct in his assessment. Governor 
Barron had the opportunity and the power to make West 
Virginia actively pursue civil rights. Instead, he opted to 
dodge his responsibility to the black citizens of West 
Virginia. 
To the CIP, Governor Barron's executive order was 
nothing short of a "deterrent to better race relations in 
the state of West Virginia.1142 The segregationists of West
Virginia could continue their discriminatory practices 
without fear of state intervention, and Quesenberry 
continued to refuse to serve black customers in his 
restaurant . . With little alternative, the CIP determinedly 
resumed sit-in demonstrations against the White Pantry on 
October 18, 1963. Quesenberry once again resorted to 
lighting sulfur and setting off insecticides within the 
restaurant to drive out the CIP demonstrators. Despite all . 
43 efforts, nothing had changed. 
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As Bunche Gray has said, "In order to keep a ,man down 
h , h h. .,44 you have to stay t ere wit 1m. Quesenberry was willing 
to sacrifice his business, energy, and humanity to treat 
blacks �s inferiors and to attack whites who befriended 
blacks. As has already been demonstrated, Quesenberry 
willingly utilized violence and the activists never knew 
what to expect. Michael Gray noted that "you took your life 
into your own hands" when the CIP activists protested at 
White Pantry. Reportedly Quesenberry tended to go after 
whites who participated in the demonstrations with blacks; 
this supposedly bothered him more than anything else. 
However, ample evidence exists to suggest that Quesenberry 
physically attacked black demonstrators as well. For 
example, one of the most r�counted acts of violence 
perpetuated by Quesenberry involved Phil Carter. During one 
of the demonstrations at the White Pantry, Quesenberry 
wounded Carter with an electric cattle prod.45
Aside from dispensing verbal and physical abuse, 
Quesenberry often sacrificed business to avoid 
c6nfrontations with the CIP. As a result, the CIP depended 
upon surprise attacks when dealing with Quesenberry and the 
White Pantry. Michael Gray described the process the CIP 
went through in order to protest the discriminatory policy 
at the White Pantry: 
We could never let Quesenberry know when we were 
coming because he would lock the door. So, we 
would all meet on different corners and then 
• 
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slowly walk to the corner of Fifth Avenue and 
Ninth Street ... and then when we turned the corner 
we would run because someone passing would say, 
'Here they come!' and he would lock the doors. 
And he would pass up any more lunch crowd just to 
keep us out. We would have to r�g and hit that
door and fill up all the booths. 
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To help facilitate gaining entry into the White Pantry, 
the CIP had white supporters enter the restaurant. When the 
signal came, these white CIP activists blocked the 
restaurant doors open with their bodies so Quesenberry or 
others could not lock the black CIP demonstrators out of the 
establishment. Also, one of the demonstrators always had 
the role of waiting at a nearby telephone and calling an 
h d 1. 47 attorney, t e newspapers, an po ice . 
Once inside the White Pantry, CIP activists endured the 
fumes from the sulfur and insecticides because nobody else 
wanted to eat in a place full of bug spray and other noxious 
effluviums. Part of the strategy by the CIP was to let 
Quesenberry damage his own business. This helps explain why 
the CIP usually protested on Saturdays. Besides freeing the 
student demonstrators of school responsibilities, Saturdays 
were the best day of business for the White Pantry.48
Yet, even the surprise sit-ins and picketing and the 
CIP's tenacity failed to persuade Quesenberry to serve 
blacks in his restaurant. A year after the CIP renewed 
demonstrations against the White Pantry, the group was still 
protesting the restaurant's policy of discrimination. On 
October 1, 1964, about twenty CIP activists entered the 
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White Pantry and staged another sit-in. Quesenberry then 
c.losed the restaurant and ignited a substance which produced
sulfurous fumes. All but four of the demonstrators exited 
the premise�. Infuriated that Phil Carter, Frank Helvey, 
Danie Stewart and Pat McBrayer had withstood the sulphurous 
fumes, Quesenberry, as he had in the past, went to a justice 
of the peace and swore oµt warrants for their arrests on the 
·charge of trespassing. Within a few moments the police 
removed the four remaining CIP demonstrators from the White 
49Pantry. 
The CIP retaliated on Saturday, October 10, 1964 with 
another, even larger demonstration. About thirty students 
from West Virginia State College joined Marshall University 
students and CIP activists in sitting-in and picketing the 
White Pantry. Quesenberry closed the restaurant and sent 
the employees out of the establishment while the 
demonstrators remained within the restaurant for over an 
hour. However, for some reason, Quesenberry did not set off 
fumigates or light sulfur this time.50 
On October 23; 1964, Quesenberry spoke his piece as the 
only witness to testify at the hearing for the four 
demonstrators he had had arrested on October 1, 1964. 
Justice of the Peace Johnny Miller and an audience comprised 
mostly of MU students listened to Quesenberry's testimony . 
Quesenberry stated that he did kick Phil Carter after Carter 
came behind the counter, but otherwise he did nothing to 
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provoke the protest. On cross examination, Quesenberry 
-confessed he did set off "spray bombs" after he closed the
White Pantry in the middle of the day. When asked whether
the White Pantry was open 24 hours a day Quesenberry
affirmed that to be true "except when we close for certain
reasons . " In other words , the Wh i t e Pan try c 1 o s e d when
blacks came to demonstrate. More important though, for the
case at hand, Quesenberry never established a case proving
trespassing. As a result, assistant prosecuting attorney
Edward V. Lee requested that the trespassing charges and a
peace warrant against Phil Carter be dismissed. Justice of
the Peace Miller concurred and Phil Carter, Frank Helvey,
Danie Stewart, and Pat McBrayer left the hearing cleared of
all charges brought against them. Quesenberry was once
again foiled in his effort to use the legal system to thwart
the CIP.51 
Nevertheless, Quesenberry held firm in his refusal to 
serve blacks until compelled to do so by law. Having failed 
to obtain such a law at the municipal and state levels, the 
CIP had to wait for the United States Congress to pass the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 which made most forms of racial 
discrimination unlawful . .  The CIP actively supported this 
legislation by participating in the March on Washington on 
August 28, 1963, and participating in an April 11, 1964, 
demonstration against West Virginia Senator Robert C. Byrd 
to protest his non-support of the civil rights bill.
52 
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Once the bill became law Quesenberry still hesitated to 
comply. The White Pantry did not serve blacks until 
Quesenberry felt compelled by the Supreme Court decisions in 
December 1964, which upheld the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
Even then, quiet negotiations had to take place between 
Quesenberry and Huntington Human Rights Commission (HRC) 
members before he agreed to integrate. Unsurprisingly, 
however, Quesenberry flatly refused ever to serve Phil 
Carter and apparently the HRC did not object because Carter 
recalled. somehow being informed of this development.53 So,
it appears that Carter, without his permission, had to 
forego his right as a citizen to eat at the White Pantry in 
order for the restaurant to be integrated. Carter never 
intended to eat at the White Pantry, but he still has strong 
feelings about the treatment he received: 
So what the Hell. I had no intention of going in 
there in the first damn place, except it was the 
principle .... I resented the negotiations that went 
on, however. To ... negotiate me out as a 
settlement, that I deeply resented. Because I 
felt that was the epitomy of siploitation and 
that's exactly what was done. 
Carter abided by his exile and everybody who knew of the 
arrangement, probably the HRC members, the black community, 
the white activists,·and the CIP, let it stand. 
Though the White Pantry eventually integrated, 
Quesenberry's resistance had its impact on the Huntington 
community. Carter believed that "the White Pantry became a 
symbol; it was a rallying point for whites.1155 Carter said
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this happened because of the pers�nality of Roba Quesenberry 
who, like George Wallace in Alabama, became a symbol of 
white bigotry. Carter believed that Quesenberry had a major 
impact on Huntington: 
You find every once in a while some center of 
opposition, and I think that [the White Pantry] 
was the center of street oppostion. The center of 
legal opposition was Bailey's. And when they 
realized, Hell, we can't win this and besides it's 
going to hurt our damn business if we don't get 
our act straight, they decided 'okay, we'll cool 
it.' The other guy [Roba Quesenberry] said no; he 
was making a stand. And so he made a stand. What 
it did was really crystallize the depth of racism 
in West Virginia in this area. Right there on 
that coiner. It actually crystallized it for 
everyone to see very, very clearly. And, it also 
illustrated the paucity of white leadership in 
responsible positions, and the passive support of 
masses of whites that really existed where whites 
openly and overtly challen§gd black rights to eat
in public accommodations." 
Quite simply, by resisting integration and baring his 
prejudices, Quesenberry mobilized the racist attitudes that 
existed in Huntington into a tacit anti-civil rights street 
opposition capable of violence. Comparisons between 
Huntington and Mississippi and between Quesenberry and 
George Wallace, segregationist Governor of Alabama, openly 
circulated. In his decision on Quesenberry's petition for 
an injunction, Judge John W. Hereford noted that "it would 
be difficult to find, outside of the State of Alabama and 
the executive mansion of that state, a greater display of 
prejudice and hate than has been shown by the evidence in 
this case.1157 The CIP had activated its handful of
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supporters and Quesenberry effectively crystallized 
opponents to the CIP and civil rights. However, the 
majority of Huntingtonians continued to ignore the problem . 
Because, as Bunche Gray declared, "the average person in 
Buntington saw nothing wrong with it [segregation], they 
pretended they didn't know ... that blacks were being kept 
out.1158
Nevertheless, the CIP, through its protest 
demonstrations, made Quesenberry, Floyd Walker, and other 
Huntington business people catering to the public, deal with 
the issue of civil rights and, except Quesenberry, change 
their policies. Though the CIP-led protests against the 
White Pantry did not force Quesenberry to integrate, the 
demonstrations did help persuade other Huntington businesses 
to integrate when CIP activists visited . Because business 
owners did not want to have what was happening at the White 
Pantry happen to them, most, if not all, Huntington 
establishments voluntarily eliminated segregation policies 
to avoid conflict with the CIP. For example, the Orpheum 
Theater closed down for a short time for renovation during 
the CIP's existence. When the theater reopened, blacks and 
whites entered the same main entrance and sat where they 
pleased rather than the previous two separate entrances and 
blacks relegated to the balcony.59
Through willingness to initiate protests and to take a 
stand in the struggle for civil rights, the CIP sparked the 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
90 
movement to integrate Huntington's business community. The 
GIP forced the people of Huntington to take notice of civil 
rights and pressured them to change their discriminatory, 
status quo practices and attitudes. Every establishment 
engaged by the GIP activists discontinued racially 
discriminatory practices, even, with a little help from the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the United States Supreme 
Court, the White Pantry. Truly, it can be said that black 
and white activists, including the GIP, made life a little 
better for blacks in Huntington. Problems still existed, 
but segregation in.public accommodations was not a major 
b . l 
60 arr1er any onger . 
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Chapter IV Appendix 
Portion of Judge John W. Hereford's 
Decision on September 7, 1963 in 
Quesenberry v. Cleckley 
I will say here and now as I said a few months ago in 
anothei case of like kind that I don't think any lawyer could 
dispute the fact that the Supreme Court of the United States has 
by its decisions said.that the American Negro has civil rights 
the same as any other citizen: that they are citizens, and that 
the spirit of the Constitution of the United States guarantees to 
them the same rights that it guarantees to me. 
And yet, in spite of the spirit of the Constitution and the 
spirit expressed by the Supreme Court of the United States with 
relation to the Constitution, there are still little people in 
this world that would still deprive the American Negroes,.who are 
American citizens the same as I am, of the rights that were 
promised them 100 years ago but have been denied them for 99 to 
100 of that period since the promise was made . 
What this petitioner is doing is depriving the American 
Negroes of Huntington or elsewhere from coming into his place of 
business and enjoying the same privileges of his fine restaurant 
-- although I have never been in it I am sure it is a fine one -­
declining to allow a person, just because his skin is a different 
color than mine, refusing to allow him the same privilege that I 
would be allowed if I walked into his place of business. 
I say that is something that the Supreme Court has, I think 
very definitely, watered down and placed in the area of 
condemnation. And if what the petitioner is doing was done by a 
governmental agency, by a state, by a city, by a county, they 
would be enjoined immediately from doing such a thing, from 
practicing segregation in a business that is operated by 
taxation. And yet the petioner would come into this court and 
ask this court to protect him in his attempt to do that which the 
Supreme Court of the United States says that the state couldn't 
do or the county couldn't do. 
Now, let us concede that as an American citizen he has 
rights the same as everybody else, and he has a right to be 
foolish if he wants to: he has a right to take the position that 
he is not going to permit integration in his place of business: 
he has a right to do all of those things. And I would be the 
first to accord him those rights. But I am saying now I am 
holding that he has no right to come into a court of law and ask 
me as judge of this court, in a court of chancery, in a court of 
conscience, in a court of the heart -- he has no right to come 
into this court and ask me to protect him in doing something that 
the Constitution of the United States, according to the Supreme 
Court, says is not proper and could not be done by a governmental 
agency 
So this court is not about to lend its good offices to help 
this petitioner or any other petitioner to enforce something that 
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contrary to the spirit of the Constitution and the decisions 
the Supreme Court of the United States. 
And I am going to go further and hold in this proceeding 
thit when a man such as this petitioner gets a license from the 
State of West Virginia and from the City of Huntington -- and the 
eourt takes judicial notice of that fact -- to serve the public 
iP the form of furnishing a place for people to eat, and when 
that business that he is operating has to be inspected by the 
health department of the city, they have to make an examination 
of the cleanliness of the place, the toilet facilities, the 
cleanliness of the kitchen, they have to go in there and inspect 
it and place a rating on the business, and that has to be done by 
a public official, and that public official is paid by taxpayer's 
money, including taxes that are paid by the Negroes, and then 
make the Negroes help pay for inspecting a restaurant that only 
white people can eat in and that the door is slammed in the face 
of the Negroes is, I think, unreasonable and unpardonable. 
I think, in addition to that, that there have to be fire 
inspections that have to be conducted by public officials that 
are paid by the taxpayers, including taxes that are paid by the 
Negroes too. And to tax the Negro in order to pay the salaries 
of somebody that has to inspect a business from which the Negro 
is shut out, is not good Americanism, is not Constitutional, and 
is contrary, in my way of thinking to the laws of the great State 
of West Virginia. 
So I am about to say and am saying that when the State of 
West Virginia issues a license and the City of Huntington issues 
a license to do business and serve the public, that the Negro is 
as much a part of the public as the white man, and that they 
would be obligated to serve him too.* 
*For citation see footnote number 32 of this chapter .
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Chapter V 
Moving the Movement to MU 
During the struggle for civil rights in Huntington, the 
CIP did not overlook the need for action in its own backyard 
-- Marshall University. The CIP began focusing attention on 
Marshall's campus in the spring of 1964. Most of 
Huntington's businesses had been integrated by this time, 
but the battle over integration still raged at the White 
Pantry. Nevertheless, the CIP felt compelled to attempt to 
improve MU's campus environment and continued for a year to 
tear down the facade of racial harmony at Marshall. The CIP 
activists were by then seasoned civil rights veterans· and 
brought this experience with them to the MU campaign . 
However, they also had acquired a reputation in some circles 
as troublemakers and a number of enemies who favored vague 
promises over direct action tactics. The University's 
administration and Student Senate had taken this position 
from the start of the CIP's agitation in Huntington. 
Gaining their support to fight campus discrimination proved 
to be difficult to obtain. 
Even the need for CIP action at MU was and has been 
disputed. In 1981, Charles H. Moffat, retired Chair of the 
History Department, in his book, Marshall University: An 
Institution Comes of Age, 1837-1980, described race 
relations at Marshall University (MU) in the early and mid 
1960s as rather serene: 
• 
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The Smith administration [1946 to 1968] had 
brought about a relatively peaceful transition in 
the evolution of race relations at Marshall, an 
achievement that represents a historical 
watershed; however, there would be troubled days 
ahead for President Smith's successor, as 
intransigent black students, acting in concert 
with the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS)1made demands upon the university administration. 
Moffat referred in this passage to President Stewart H. 
Smith's ability to keep a lid on civil rights activism in 
the early to mid 1960s. Moffat clearly implied that Smith 
and his administrators were predominantly responsible for 
improving MU's environment for black students through an 
evolutionary or gradual approach. Smith's leadership, 
according to Moffat, was the key to a moderate integration 
of blacks into student life at MU, at a pace determined by 
Smith, the MU community and the Huntington community. 
Yet, because of the practices and attitudes of the 
groups the CIP challenged, all was not as serene as Moffat 
portrayed and Smith would have liked. Moffat indicated an 
awareness of this when he added the qualifier "relatively" 
to his phrase "peaceful transition." However, Moffat still 
missed the mark with his analysis of race relations at 
Marshall. His portrayal is a classic example of William 
Chafe's concept of the "progressive mystique" whereby people 
believed that a paternalistic white establishment took care 
of blacks and that a willingness to discuss issues, not to 
take action, determined how progressive a person was.2
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If Moffat's interpretation had been entirely correct, 
civil rights groups such as the CIP would have been 
unnecessary at MU. However, nothing could �e further from 
the truth. The CIP's very existence, created as a response 
to local and campus problems, disproves Moffat's scenario. 
For example, .Smith preferred to operate discreetly behind 
the scenes with little disruption of daily operations. But, 
while his methods might have been appropriate for the 1950s, 
they were totally inadequate for the needs and demands of 
the early to mid 1960s. As a challenge organization, the 
CIP believed in creating public awareness by publicizing an 
issue in order to force people either to support civil 
rights or to contribute to the problem by doing nothing or 
worse. In all probability, a driving force such as the CIP 
was necessary to push a generally complacent Marshall 
University more quickly toward racial justice. 
In 1962, Smith claimed that MU was far ahead of 
Huntington in the matter of racial integration, and quite 
possibly it was, but only in the sense that blacks had 
attended Marshall since i954 .. However, integration at MU 
did not eliminate discriminatory practi�es and attitudes, 
and Phil Carter believed that "Marshall's administration and 
leadership was totally unresponsive" to black students' 
concerns. To understand Carter's and the other CIP 
activists' position concerning the necessity for the CIP, an 
. 
analysis of the pre-CIP Marshall environment coupled with 
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the CIP's impact on creating awareness of racial injustice 
is essential. In particular, the posture of MU's 
administration as personified by Smith and the attitudes of 
the faculty and representatives in student government before 
and after the' CIP' s challenge to fight discrimination and 
negative attitudes need careful examination.3
Most institutional policies reflect the values of its 
leaders, and MU was no exception. "President Smith," wrote 
Charles Moffat, "was consistently in the vanguard as a 
vigorous champion of human rights.114 Smith did support the
rights of blacks to enroll at MU even before the Supreme 
Court outlawed school segregation in Brown� Board of 
Education� Topeka (1954). Blacks matriculated into the 
Graduate School at MU in the fall of 1951. However, a 1949 
federal court order forcing the University of Kentucky to 
integrate its Graduate School and a decision by the West 
Virginia Board of Education in 1950 permitting resident 
blacks to matriculate into the graduate schools at the 
institutions of higher learning in West Virginia provided 
the context within which Smith's decision was made, and 
would seem to suggest he was a follower, not a leader.5
With the Brown decision in 1954, the doors to an 
undergraduate education opened to people of all races. 
Throughout the 1950s a small but steady influx of black 
students enrolled at MU. Also, Moffat approvingly asserted 
that "Smith attempted to eradicate every vestige of 
• 
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116 discrimination on the campus. To corraborate this, Moffat
cited Smith's ending of an annual black-face minstrel show 
performed by the campus chapter of Omicron Delta Kappa, a 
national leadership honorary. Regarding this incident, 
Moffat quoted Smith as saying the black-face minstrel show 
"ridicules and exaggerates the shortcomings of the Negro 
race.117 Obviously, Smith believed either consciously or
unconsciously, that blacks as a race did have shortcomings. 
Nevertheless, Moffat concluded that Marshall had a "quiet 
and successful social revolution" in which its 
"administrators deservedly cherished a feeling of 
self-satisfaction about their own success in effecting 
. 1 d. 
"8racia a Justment .... 
Smith did play a significant role in integrating MU. 
Yet, Marion T. "Bunche" Gray stressed that Smith was a good 
man but "out of touch" with the problems and needs of MU's 
black students in the early Sixties.9 Phil Carter called
Smith "one of the ultra neutrals which [sic] contributed to 
our problem.111° Carter elaborated:
This concept of really being overly fair, and 
really being fundamentally neutral and really 
being color blind [was a farce]. Well, first of 
all, it wasn't an equal situation. [It] was not a 
neutral environment. And it certainly wasn't 
color blind. So people who put on those blinders 
and used that rhetoric and [took] that stance, 
contribute to a worsening of the situation, rather 
than to try to recognize that there are problems, 
face up to them, and then identify the problem and 
then work on the solution ... There were serious 
problems on this campu11with student attitudes and perceptions of blacks. 
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Carter thought that Smith failed to initiate action to 
r�ctify the problems present on MU's campus. Smith was the 
leader; he was supposed to have sensitivity and vision. 
Most importantly, he had the power to do something about 
. 1 d. . . : 12 rac1a 1scr1m1nat1on. Charles Aurand, a white minister
at St. Paul'� Lutheran Church and former student at MU, 
remembered Smith as being morally and ideologically opposed 
to racial discrimination, but feared going too far to oppose 
it. "Publicly he always did the right thing, and, I think 
that he was one of those whites, which many of us were, who 
wanted the right thing done by blacks. But, he never felt 
that he wanted to go too far out on a limb for it.1113
Michael Gray, a native black Huntingtonian and member 
. 14 of the CIP, recalled that "Smith was about status quo." 
Consequently, the black students never felt they could count 
on President Smith to deal with their concerns. Gray 
suggested that most black students realized that, in 
general, some university presidents were far worse than 
Smith, "but as black students we damn sure didn't consider 
S . h . 1115 m1t very progressive. The black students knew of other 
university presidents who vigorously attacked racial 
discrimination and sought a better learning environment for 
all students. Michael Gray, Phil Carter, and probably most 
of MU's black students in the 1960s, believed that Smith did 
not actively seek to create a better campus environment for 
black students. Smith intellectually and morally condemned 
• 
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racial discrimination and made gestures in that direction, 
but he maintained a neutrality that did not all�w him to 
deal with the problems and needs of the black students. 
Perhaps unintentionally, Smith's neutrality actually hurt 
black students, hence the necessity of a challenge 
organization like the CIP to prod him into awareness of and 
possible action on civil rights and racial justice issues. 
Unfortunately, President Smith never rose to meet the 
CIP's challenge. Though many people viewed Smith as a 
progressive liberal in the vanguard of civil rights, he 
never demonstrated it in his dealings with the CIP. Smith 
acknowledged the need for civil rights and signed all of the 
appropriate documents in compliance with the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, but tended to rest upon the laurels of his past 
achievements and perpetuated a "go slow" mentality favoring 
the status quo. To Smith, significant changes had already 
been made. For further growth, however, attitudes needed to 
be changed, and he seemed to be willing to wait lifetimes to 
give people time to alter their racial perceptions. As a 
result, President Smith, as shall be noted time and again, 
failed to initiate or take concrete action designed to fight 
d
. . . . 
d . 1 1· 161scr1m1nat1on an promote racia equa 1ty. 
In general, the faculty at MU followed President 
S�ith's lead and assumed an anti-discrimination but neutral 
posture. For example, in October of 1962, shortly after 
racial violence erupted at the University of Mississippi, 
• 
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the faculty passed unanimously a resolution which in part 
read: 
In view of our special responsibility to 
contribute to the well-being of our students, 
and ... because we believe there are no valid 
grounds for racial discrimination ... the faculty of 
Marshall University deplores all acts of racial 
disc:imi�ati�� and urges their prompt
termination . 
The author of the resolution, Paul Alexander, instructor in 
Political Science, stated that the resolution sought to 
"indicate the moral support of the faculty for those 
students who were seeking to reduce racial 
d. . . · . .,18 iscrimination. However, approval of the resolution did
not lead to any apparent positive action by faculty on 
behalf of black students. 
Relatively few faculty members met the CIP challenge. 
But, on occasion, the CIP activists turned to Simon Perry, 
Bill Cook and Paul Stewart for advice. These professors 
provided a willingness to speak out, using the language the 
CIP felt appropriate.19 On advising the CIP activists,
Perry said, " ... I tried to make them feel that there was a 
vast social science literature that was supportive of what 
they were doing." Perry and a few other professors provided 
"positive reinforcement" to the CIP activists during and 
f h . d . 
. H . d 20 a ter t e1r emonstrat1ons 1n unt1ngton an on campus. 
Bunche Gray told of a time when Cook operated a public 
relations office and had criticized the Huntington Chapter 
of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
• 
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People (NAACP) for its format and tactics. When Bunche 
Gray, chair of the Membership Committee for the local 
chapter, asked for his help, he declined because he feared 
losing his white clients. Yet, white liberals like Cook 
could or would go only so far in backing their convictions. 
Cook, an economics professor, played a very important role 
for black students and the CIP. Cook and his wife opened 
their home to the CIP, and both raised questions and 
suggested books and articles to read.21 
Other than these primary collaborators, however, MU's 
faculty members' contributions were minimal at best. Some 
young professors may have feared not getting tenure, but 
innumerable others apparently just did not want to rock the 
boat. The faculty was basically silent on the roles played 
by Perry, Cook and Stewart in support of the CIP. The lack 
of either verbal support or criticism seems to indicate 
indifference and possibly disdain by much of the MU 
22faculty . 
In an attempt to understand and improve black student 
life at MU, before the CIP's emergence, Student Senate 
Speaker Walt Crosby created a committee in 1961 to 
investigate practices of racial discrimination on or near 
the MU campus. Carolyn Karr (chair), William Calderwood, 
Aubrey King, and Tom Stafford served as committee members. 
The committee investigated allegations supplied by black MU 
students. Once a charge was made, the committee sought to 
• 
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determine the policies of the off campus establishment in 
question, why the policies existed, and if change was 
shortly forthcoming in the establishments' policies. On 
October 10, 1962, the committee presented its findings to 
the Student Senate. Discriminatory practices abounded. 
Campus Sundries, a small fast food restaurant which catered 
to MU students, sold to blacks but prohibited them from 
sitting at the counter. Colonial Lanes (bowling alley), the 
American Legion Hall, and Camden Park refused blacks 
admittance into their establishments on an individual basis, 
but did permit entry if the black was a part of a large and 
predominatedly white group. The Palace Theater and El Gato, 
a drinking establishment frequented by white Marshall 
students, completely denied service to blacks. As a result, 
the committee concluded: 
. .. discriminatory practices do exist at 
establishments near the campus and in those 
establishments which college students frequent as 
a source of recreation and diversion .... Such 
practices are not enticing to a Negro athl23e or
scholar who might want to attend Marshall . 
Considering the negative impact of such pervasive 
discrimination on MU students, the committee made two 
recommendations. First, the committee recommended the 
Student Senate create a permanent Human Rights Commission. 
This body would study the relationship between all MU 
students and the Huntington community, study the 
relationship between black MU students and the Huntington 
• 
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community, and present findings and coordinate activities 
with the Huntington Human Rights Commission (HRC). Second, 
the committee proposed that the Student Senate somehow show 
its displeasure towards establishments discriminating 
against black MU students.24
After the committee presented its report and 
recommendations to the Student Senate, Senator William 
Calderwood, also a member of the committee, proposed that 
the Student Senate act upon the committee's recommendations . 
An hour long debate ensued. Clark Todd and Claren Brooks 
led the opposition against forming a human rights 
commission. The opponents argued that the Student Senate's 
jurisdiction ended with the campus boundary, and besides, 
Huntington's HRC did not need "junior adults" to interfere 
in matters the city commission was perfectly able to handle . 
Proponents, led by Aubrey King, countered by arguing that 
the Student Senate's jurisdiction extended to any thing or 
place effecting MU students and students should be involved 
in community matters because they were the future civic 
l�aders. King added that the student commission would 
investigate grievances brought to its attention, including 
any against campus groups, sororities, and fraternities. 
However, the student commission could only study charges of 
discriminatory practices, and did not have the power to take 
. 1 d' . . bl ZSaction to reso ve 1scr1m1natory pro ems. 
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Apparently, King's arguments proved persausive enough 
to help attain a favorable ten to eight vote to create the 
student commission on a one year trial basis under the 
direction of the Publications and Public Relations 
Committee. Student Body President Gary McMillan set up a 
special Parliamentary Affairs Committee to study the Human 
Rights Commission. The Parliamentary Affairs Committee 
consisted of six student senators (three pro and three con): 
Tom Dunfee, William Calderwood, Mike Carroll, Ivan Ash, 
Patty Bartlett, and Claren Brooks. The major product of 
this student commission was the previously cited report 
delivered to the Student.Senate by Stuart Thomas and 
apparently ignored by President Smith.26
Nevertheless, the Student Senate had taken a little 
initiative in recognizing that racial discrimination existed 
and adversely effected all MU students, particularly the 
black students. However, the student Human Rights 
Commission had no real power or influence and consequently 
proved to be useless. Yet, by following the example of 
President Smith and the faculty, this is what the Student 
Senate advocated. Actions such as anti-discrimination 
statements, resolutions, and the creation of a powerless 
commission could do very little to alleviate racial 
discrimination in Huntington or improve the campus 
environment for black MU students . 
• 
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After the formation of the CIP, MU's Student Senate did 
not act on human rights or racial discrimination until 
November 6, 1963, when it abolished the one year old student 
Human Rights Commission. The coordinator and former 
opponent of the student commission, Claren Andrews nee 
Brooks recommended the dismantling of the commission. She 
cited that only three problems had come before the 
commission and the one year trial period was over. Simon 
Perry, the advisor to Student Government, ardently argued 
against getting rid of the Human Rights Commission, but to 
little avail. A compromise, however, was made to transfer 
the commission's power to investigate allegations of racial 
discrimination to the Student Government Affairs 
. · 27 Committee. 
Pat Austin delivered the CIP's response to these 
actions in a letter in The Parthenon. Austin and the CIP 
looked at the student Human Rights Commission as a gesture 
of good faith that civil rights would be forthcoming . 
Austin wrote: 
The road to freedom ... is marked with guide 
posts saying, 'Go Slow, Negro,' meaning 'Don't Go, 
Negro.' Every so often the weary traveler meets a 
benevolent being who hands him a token of freedom . 
The traveler, bent with the age of 100 years, 
accepts the token as a ray of hope, and trudges on 
in the faith that he will someday attain the 
actual torch of freedom. 
Marshall2� former Human Rights Commission ·was
such a token. 
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Austin acknowledged the shortcomings of the student 
commission, particularly its powerlessness, but urged the 
Student Senate to reconsider the abolishment of the Human 
Rights Commission. She thought the student commission 
should not only have been kept, but its powers expanded 
since racial discrimination still abounded in Huntington and 
at MU. Thus, the need for the Human Rights Commission 
existed. This, Austin believed, should have been the 
criteria for keeping the student commission, not how many 
allegations it received. Also, she insisted the Human 
Rights Commission could have been a potential mechanism for 
change: 
A student Human Rights Commission could be an 
effective instrument of justice with the 
appointment of persons possessing strong 
convictions, who are not afraid to stand2�nd be
counted in the battle for human dignity . 
Austin's letter had no apparent impact upon the Student 
Senate; however, the incident caused the CIP to direct some 
attention toward forcing the all-white Student Senate to 
take a stand on the issue of civil rights and establish 
itself as a friend or enemy of MU's black students. Before 
Thanksgiving break in 1963, the Student Senate passed 
Resolution 107 which asked all Marshall students to boycott 
any establishment which practiced racial discrimination.30
Senator Frank Varacalli introduced this resolution . 
However, Varacalli was only a partner in the promotion of 
this resolution; Danie Stewart, sophomore class president 
• 
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and CIP activist, co-authored the resolution and initially 
played a quiet, behind-the-scene role. So, Varacalli was 
essentially the front for the CIP efforts to get the Student 
Senate to take a stand on civil right� and racial 
d. . . . 3
1 
·1.scr1.m1.nat1.on. 
With the initial passage of Resolution 107, the CIP 
appeared to have won an important moral battle, i£ not an 
enforcable, practical remedy for discrimination. However, 
Ken Gainer, Student Body President, vetoed the resolution 
two weeks later, asserting that: 
while I am personally opposed to 
discrimination, at this time I feel that the realm 
of our legislative power as a Student Government 
ends when we leave the campus or any property 
owned or rented by Marshall University for the 
Student Body . 
. Secon12Y, I feel that the resolution isambiguous. 
When asked to elaborate on his veto statement, Gainer said 
that the phrases like "racial discrimination" and "public 
establishment" were vague and made the resolution unclear in 
its purpose. Gainer rambled on in his reasoning to note 
that specific establishments were not cited in the 
resolution, contributing to its general vagueness. Gainer 
concluded his assessment of Resolution 107 by questioning 
whether the resolution was "really the feeling of the entire 
student body, rather than just the 12 members of the Student 
Senate who approved it.1133
• 
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e Frank Varacalli attacked Gainer's veto and his reasons 
for it: 
... any president who uses his powers for such · 
discriminatory ends reflects a degree of prejudice 
• of his own. 
• 
• 
• 
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Nowhere in this resolutio� do I see any 
ambiguity. I repeat that discrimination even 
possibly exist�4within the walls of the Student Senate itself . 
Danie Stewart, who viewed the struggle for racial justice at 
MU as inextricably linked to the Huntington community 
environment, also voiced resentment at Gainer's appraisal 
and veto. Stewart did not agree with Gainer's assessment of 
ambiguous language and insisted that most of MU's students 
supported the legislation. Most importantly, Stewart made a 
very astute observation. Resolution 107 was a request, not 
a demand that MU students avoid establishments practicing 
racial discrimination. A ban on establishments catering to 
MU students and practicing racial discrimination could not 
realistically be enforced. However, the resolution only 
asked students not to patronize discriminating 
establishments.35
The resolution represented a noble symbolic gesture 
capable of tremendous results. The resolution, if complied 
with by the student body, had enormous potential impact. 
Blacks elsewhere, in the 1955-56 Montgomery bus boycott, for 
example, had successfully utilized economic boycotts to 
secure objectives. Resolution 107 could have resulted in a 
similiar situation� The black student population was not 
• 
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large enough to use economic boycotts successfully. 
However, MU's white student population was more than 
sufficient to sustain such a tactic. Had Gainer not vetoed 
the resolution and had enough of the MU student body 
complied, the businesses depending heavily on MU students 
might have been forced ta alter their discriminatory 
practices. Gainer understood and feared these implications 
when he quipped, "This is just leaving us wide open. 1136 
The resolution still had a chance even after Gainer's 
veto. A week later, Varacalli and Stewart tried to garner a 
two-thirds majority in the Student Senate to override 
Gainer's veto. After Varacalli resubmitted the resolution 
with exactly the same wording, Stewart went to work. 
According to a The Parthenon article, Stewart delivered "a 
dramatic and emotion-packed speech, which rang with sounds 
of the Declaration of Independence and the American ideals 
f h 
. 1137 o t e American way .... Apparently, Stewart's speech was 
a fine piece of oratory that even won praise from members of 
the opposition. However, Stewart's effort was not enough. 
Sally Montgomery, graduate senator from Huntington, led the 
opposition forces in defeating the effort to override the 
veto. Montgomery argued that "the proposed resolution in 
reality was foolish for 'talking down' to Marshall students, 
and to the Student Senate, itself . 1138 Certainly, Stewart
did not consider seeking justice and equality "foolish." 
Nevertheless, the Student Senate, in not overturning 
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Gainer's veto, failed to join the CIP in the fight against 
racial discrimination and set a negative example for the 
rest of the student body . 
Six months later, Stewart once again forced the all­
white student senators to take a stand on civil rights. At 
the May 20, 1964, meeting of the Student Senate, John Cross 
introduced a resolution to condemn the practice of racial 
discrimination and to support the civil rights legislation 
being considered in the United States Senate (the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964). Then Cross turned the floor over to 
Stewart who thereafter carried the struggle for the 
resolution. Student Body President Dick Cottrill suggested 
that "Danie Stewart has done it again. He's thrown this 
issue right in our laps.1139
This time Stewart had a little more success. He 
asserted that most MU students supported the resolution and 
the Student Senate should vote according to the students' 
wishes. Senat�r Dean Thompson led the opposition forces 
against the resolution, arguing that he and other student 
senators had not had sufficient time to examine the 
resolution thoroughly. This was in spite of a one week 
notice that the resolution would be introduced and every 
student senator had been urged to become familiar with it. 
Despite stall tactics such as this, a vote was taken on 
Cross' resolution which passed ten to eight. More than 
likely, Dick Cottrill's approval of the resolution helped 
• 
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push it through the Student Senate. When leaders like 
Cottrill provided support, others followed their lead. So, 
Stewart had Cottrill's help in convincing his fellow student 
senators to support the resolution. In addition, Cross' 
resolution was not quite so controversial as Resolution 107 
which had recommende.d taking a somewhat more active stance . 
Even so, for the vote to be so close, considerable 
opposition apparently existed in the Student Senate 
concerning the concept of civil rights, let alone doing 
anything about the problem. Varacalli may have been correct 
in his suggestion that discrimination existed "within the 
walls of the Student Senate itself .1140
But, this is not to imply a total lack of sympathy for 
the goal of the CIP by members of the Student Senate. Frank 
Varacalli, John Cross, and Danie Stewart have already been 
mentioned. One can also add Richard "Rick" A. Diehl to the 
list. Both Diehl and Stewart were activists and core 
members of the CIP. Many times they participated side by 
side in demonstrations, and they often prodded the Student 
Senate to fight racial discrimination. In May 1965, Diehl 
publicly announced his resignation from the Student Senate 
in a letter in The Parthenon. As part of his letter, Diehl 
compared the CIP and Student Senate, institutions with which 
h e w a s f am i 1 i a r . He no t e d th a t " th e S t u·d e n t G o v e r nm en t i s 
much more efficient in its undertakings than is the CIP. 
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The CIP's undertakings, however, are much more significant 
than the Student Government's.1141
Diehl also believed the CIP was more democratic and 
more politically responsible than MU's Student Government. 
In a stinging critique Diehl wrote: 
The CIP is more effective in affecting social 
change leading to a democratic society than is the 
Student Government that merely says it favors a 
democratic society, but is not in favor of taking 
the steps necessary to create such a society. The 
Student Government is interested in perpetuating 
the illusion that we live in a democratic society 
because we have been taught so since childhood, 
whereas the CIP is interested in making that 
illusion a reality whereby all men are guaranteed 
social, political, and economic justice� The 
Student Government seems to be in a 'Let's 
Pretend' game, whereas the CIP are responsible in 
the American tradition to the general guaranteed 
rights and liberities upon which the American 
society is statedly based, whereas members of the 
Student Government aie not. The CIP is interested 
in solving the great social problems facing our 
country today, whereas, members of the Student 
Government, for the most part, are barely aware 
the s e 'Prob 1 ems ex is t , and fa i 1 to re a 1 i z e their 
responsibility toward their solution. The Student 
Government, in taking its clues from the 
Administration, sacrifices social and political 
controversy for the sake of public rel��ions, and 
this is certainly not true of the CIP . 
Obviously, Diehl displayed considerable bias in his 
analysis, but not without some justification. In the last 
part of his statement, Diehl accused the Student Government 
of "taking its clues from the Administration." These were 
strong words, but seemingly his position was validated by 
the amazing similarity between the neutral stance of the 
Student Senate and the policies of President Smith. 
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The overall situation at MU remained bad for black 
students in the 1960s. Covert racial hostility and 
discrimination abounded at MU. Seldom did racism come to 
the surface, but blacks often felt it boiling beneath a 
facade of neutrality. Even sensitive whites were cognizant 
of the campus environment confronting black students . 
Political Science professor Simon Perry remembered the 
difficulty black students had in attaining "the kind of 
respect that they deserved." Charles Aurand recalled that 
many professors and students believed and sometimes stated 
that blacks "were· pushing too hard. 1143
The case of Michael Gray demonstrated that blacks 
considered the atmosphere at MU hostile. Gray, who 
graduated from Huntington High School in 1964, readily 
acknowledged that his parents influenced his thoughts on 
civil rights by encouraging critical thought and sensible 
decisions based upon considerations of equality and human 
dignity. He often spoke with several of his black friends 
at MU about the school and their activities. Even as a 
student at West Virginia State College in 1964 and 1965, 
Gray retained close ties to black MU students and the CIP 
because of a Tuesday-Thursday schedule which enabled him to 
be in Huntington from Thursday evening through Monday. 
"So," according to Gray, "although I wasn' t a student at 
Marshall, I was on the campus all the time until it was time 
44 to go back to West Virginia State for my classes.'' As a
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Huntingtonian, Gray knew what MU meant to him, his 
neighbors, and to the black students at the University. 
Except for one summer term, Gray refused to attend 
Marshall University because of the school's environment 
which was not conducive to black students. Gray had no 
difficulty choosing West Virginia State College over 
Marshall University: 
I would never have chosen Marshall University. 
Never. Being raised in the black community of 
Huntington you understood what Marshall University 
stood for, and that's basically nothing in 
connection with interest of black people. 
Marshall University from what I was hearing from 
the age of two, you know, Marshall University 
never stood for anything. So, therefore, I never 
gave a thought of going to Marshall University. 
Never. Never a thought because the impression 
that M�rsh�ll has ma�e on black4geople in thatcommunity is a negative one .... 
Gray's perceptions were apparently shared by black 
Huntington residents who knew of the environment confronting 
black students at MU, and this hurt the University's ability 
to attract and to keep bright young blacks from the area . 
MU's environment with its covert hostility and 
discrimination certainly could not and did not foster a rich 
and active student life for black students before the CIP's 
arrival in 1963. However, Charles Moffat contended that in 
the 1960s under President Smith "the vast majority of black 
students enjoyed a felicitous relationship with the student 
body, and several of them had achieved o�tstanding records 
. hl t· d .  th 1 d h' · · 11461n at e 1cs an 1n e campus ea ers 1p organ1zat1ons. 
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On one level of analysis Moffat's statement is correct. 
Black students, like Hal Greer, Roy Goines, and Marclan 
Walker; did make spectacular achievements. Greer and Goines 
broke down racial barriers in athletics and leadership 
organizations such as The Robe (senior male honorary), the 
Reserve Officers Training Corps (R.O.T.C.), and Who's Who 
Among American University and College Students. Marclan 
Walker joined Goines as a member of Who's Who, while 
integrating Fagus (senior female honorary), The Parthenon, 
the International Relations Club, and numerous other campus 
organizations.47 These were not the only black pioneers at
MU, but they were responsible for the bulk of black 
integration into student organizations on campus. Yet, this 
does not mean that blacks flocked into the "integrated" 
organizations,. or that white students openly welcomed other 
black students to join their groups. A meaningful 
examination of black student life has to be more than a 
recitation of initial racial barrier breakdowns. Prejudice 
apparently did exist in abundance and must be accounted for 
when evaluating black student life at MU in the days before 
civil rights awareness developed . 
The academic atmosphere at MU in the fifties and early 
sixties was a major source of frustration for black students 
and their campus experience. Phil Carter explained that: 
we say we really didn't face any overt 
prejudice in the classroom. But then, each one of 
us when we get together even to this day, we start 
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discussing different professors. We can 
independently come up with the same general 
conclusions. That there may have been no more than 
four, five white professors on this campus that we 
really, deep down inside felt we could get a fair 
shake from. 
When I recall some of the things that were 
said to me in the classroom, sa2e of the 
assumptions that were made .... 
Blatant racism did exist in the classroom. Phil Carter 
vividly recalled statem�nts in his Sociology class with Dr. 
Richardson that prompted him to tell other students: 
" ' don ' t be 1 i e v e w ha t th i s man i s s a y i n g i n c 1 as s . "' "The re 
were assumptions [by Richardson] that all black people had 
TB and syphillis," Carter claimed, "and he would 
literally ... come out and say these things.1149 Carter
protested what Dr. Richardson stated in class and frequently 
confronted him with articles from black magazines, but to no 
avail. Carter also recounted an incident with an economics 
professor. 
He called me 'nigger' in class, and it so 
stunned me that, you know, I just didn't know how 
in the Hell to react .... So, being the only black 
in class whenever these things would happen, you 
know, there were never more than one of us in a 
class at the same time. You knew what you would 
probably do under different circumstances, but you 
didn't know how to handle it when §aat professor 
would make those kinds of remarks . 
Carter's ciassmates also took exception to the professor's 
remark because several of the white students reportedly 
conveyed the remark to President Smith.51
To combat the discrimination they encountered, black 
students had few role models on campus to turn to for 
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support or advice. A few professors such as William Cook, 
Simon Perry, and Paul Stewart treated black students fairly, 
while making reasonable academic demands of them. Black 
students could also approach these professors for personal 
or academic advice. However, not a single black faculty 
member or administrator could act as a role model because MU 
had none. Similiarly, black students could not go to people 
in a Minority Student Office or Black Cultural Center 
because neither existed. The only blacks employed on the 
campus were in unskilled labor positions. Thus, bla�k 
students turned to Ernie McClinton, Hodges Hall maintenance 
worker, and other black workers for support and advice. 
Phil Carter remarked that McClinton "ended up being the 
counselor, the disciplinarian, and the advisor for all 
blacks.1152 
Another important aspect of any student's existence was 
a social life. However, the opportunities for a social life 
were few for MU's black students, in part because many 
social events catered exclusively to the white fraternities 
and sororities. The Greek system at MU remained a white 
domain until 1968 with the exception of one black 
fraternity, Kappa Alpha Psi, which formed in 1962. A black 
sorority did not exist until the 1970s.53 Consequently, 
fraternities and sororities did not provide a social outlet 
for black students. In the Fifties and early Sixties, 
because of the small number of blacks at MU, they tended to 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
123 
know each other personally. Occasionally, MU and West 
Virginia State College offered mixers that were open to 
black and white students. More frequently, though, black 
social life on campus revolved around rap sessions and 
d · k' 
· 
dorm r·ooms.54rin ing in 
MU's black students therefore went for entertainment to 
the Huntington black community, which centered on Eighth 
Avenue. Blacks could enjoy a great variety of activities 
there. The Bison's Club treated MU's black athletes royally 
and openly welcomed all black students, while providing an 
opportunity for black men and women to socialize together. 
Area churches and black families also provided other social 
. 
55events. 
Student life for bl�ck athletes at MU entailed even 
more exposure to covert forms of discrimination. For Phil 
Carter, integration at MU meant "integrating the athletic 
teams.1156 He estimated that seventy to eighty percent of
the black students in the early 1960s were athletes. Black 
athletes lived in Hodges Hall with white athletes, but 
blacks and whites never shared a room. In the case of an 
·odd number of athletes, somebody got a room to himself .
Additionally, an unwritten ratio system in playing black
basketball players apparently lingered into the late
S. . 57
1xt1es . 
As Bruce Moody, a graduating black basketball player, 
wrote in The Parthenon in 1962, "Athletes at Marshall are 
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not privileged to escape the hardships of racial 
d. . . . 1158 iscrimination. Moody argued that discrimination was
much more visible to athletes because they could enter 
exclusive white establishments as a part of a MU athletic 
team; however, they could not enter the same establishments 
as black individuals. Not only did this frustrate MU's 
black athletes, but it also had the potential to damage them 
pyschologically. "At times," wrote Moody, "I was quite 
depressed with the feeling of being 'different. 11159
Phil Carter contended that the atmosphere for black 
.athletes "was not conducive to growth and development of a 
black man," and that they actually felt despised by 
. 60 whites. Carter could not precisely define the feeling but
insisted many black athlet�s still carry the scars: 
Contrary to what we were able to accomplish 
athletically, there was something that never 
really accomodated us. And you'll find most of 
the athletes, most of them I have talked to, have 
the same feeling even more intense. To this day, 
they will not set foot on this campus. I tried to 
get some back in '83 and most of them told me 
point blank, 'I will never set foot on that campus 
again given the treatment that I received.' ... This 
is a very deep seated feeling of being despised. 
It goes beyond not being wanted. A feeling that 
people despised you ... We basically felt Marshall 
didn't want us having any identity. So people 
lef� here �ith those feelings and those 
attitudes. 
Carter also asserted that though MU brought in black 
athletes from all over the country and expected them to be 
aggressive.players on the field or court, they were not 
allowed to display the same assertiveness in any other phase 
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of student life. In essence, the campus environment at MU 
stymied the development of black athletes just as it 
restricted the development of a rich, well-rounded student 
life for all black students.62 
Clearly, civil rights and racial justice did not really 
exist at MU before the CIP arrived in 1963 and shook the 
campus out of its passive doldrums. With a misguided sens� 
of neutrality, President Smith, the faculty as a whole, and 
student government did not intend to do much of true 
significance about civil rights. Similarly, the campus 
environment reeked with negative feedback for most black 
students, causing a diminished black student life 
academically, socially, and athletically. Seldom could 
black MU students enjoy the richne.ss and diversity of the 
white student experience. The feeling of being whole, of 
being treated as an equal human being, escaped most black 
students' experience before 1963. To blacks, Marshall 
University had to mean something more than just letting them 
enter the classroom. The CIP proved to be essential because 
the group forced President Smith, the faculty, and the 
student body to consider black students' rights and demands 
by creating awareness of campus discrimination and negative 
racial attitudes . 
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Chapter VI 
Actions Creating Awareness at MU 
To create awareness of racial injustice and prod 
people to respond to civil rights efforts, the CIP realized 
actions designed to reveal discrimination and force a 
reaction were necessary. Consequently, the group focused 
its attack on MU's Greek system which dominated student life 
throughout the 1950s and 1960s by not only controlling 
student government, but also by monopolizing the social life 
at MU. Because the existing Greek organizations remained 
lily-white, blacks found the road to campus leadership and 
social activities effectively closed.1 In order to create 
these opportunities for themselves and other black students, 
Phil Carter and a group of black males formed the Epsilon 
Delta Chapter of Kappa Alpha Psi and obtained national 
recognition on December 2, 1962. The fraternity performed 
social service projects and provided social events like its 
annual spring formal, The Sweetheart Ball. This, however, 
did not sufficiently alleviate the problem. Creating 
sensitivity to blacks' social and leadership needs depended 
upon integration of the whole Greek system. But, not until 
1968 when John Shellcroft pledged Zeta Beta Tau did a white 
fraternity admit a black. Clearly, blacks at MU lived in a 
. d . 1 . 2 restr1cte soc1a environment. 
The CIP helped to alleviate the social deprivation at 
MU. The social activities of the CIP were not the primary 
goals of the organization, of course, but they were 
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essential. As previously mentioned, an inner circle of CIP 
core members and an outer circle of members existed. The 
outer circle consisted of students who could not become 
totally committed because of time or financial constraints 
as well as students who simply lacked a total commitment to 
the cause. Thts latter group tended to be those most 
interested in the CIP's social activities. One inner circle 
member considered the CIP's social activities a crucial 
tactic to insure workers for the organization: 
They [CIP leaders] understood you had to have so 
much social to keep this outer circle happy. 
Because if you don't ·show up on the god-damn line 
when we need you, we threw some of the best 
parties in the world, you wasn't [sic] going to be 
invited to the party. Now you never s�id that .
But shoot, that's part of the concept. 
However, unlike other organizations, the CIP threw truly 
interracial parties. The CIP knew how to use social 
activities to coax the help of those not truly committed to 
the cause and to say thank you or to reward their more 
active members. As a result, the CIP provided an oasis of 
social activity for black and white MU students.4
The major social event sponsored by the CIP was a 
Hootenanny featuring Donald Lease on the MU campus on 
November 2, 1963. Lease, a native of Huntington and nephew 
of Bunche Gray, was a drama major at Howard University and a 
rising star of folk music. A The Parthenon article claimed 
that "after a little more than two years, Lease has been 
acclaimed as one of Washington's foremost folk singers, and 
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the most sought after folk singer in the Southeastern United 
States.115 Lease frequently performed in the Washington,
D.C., area with rave reviews from entertainment critics and
had cut one album. His most famous performance to date had 
been at the Chicago Folk Festival when he sang with Odetta, 
one f h f lk . h . 6o t e greatest o singers at t at time. 
The fact .that an organization like the CIP put so much 
effort into social activities indicates the sparsity of 
interracial activities at Marshall. Full integration of the 
social life on MU's campus was not yet a reality, and the 
CIP served an important social function as a bridge that 
allowed blacks and whites to socialize with each other. 
However, the CIP's efforts alone were not sufficient to 
fulfill the social needs of MU's black students. Therefore, 
it is not surprising that the CIP attempted to eliminate the 
racism and discrimination inherent in MU's Greek system by 
exposing it to MU's administration, faculty and students. 
The first and most significant CIP protest against MU's 
Greek system involved the Kappa Alpha Order (KA). To 
ex�lude ·blacks as the fraternities and sororities did was 
one thing, but annually to parade white supremacy and Old 
South segregationist values all over campus was quite 
another matter. The KAs' Old South Weekend was such an 
event and its offensiveness infuriated a number of black MU 
students. Consequently, the CIP sought to destroy this 
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distasteful event or, at the very least, significantly alter 
it . 
The impetus behind the Old South Weekend stemmed from 
the KAs' celebration of the birthday of Robert E. Lee, the 
fraternity's spiritual founder, on the first weekend in May. 
A typical Old South Weekend began on a Thursday with the 
issuance of formal written invitations to the KAs' "Southern 
belles." The festivities started the following day with KA 
members chalking a "Mason-Dixon" line across campus and the 
administration turning the University over to the KAs who 
had " seceded" f r om the u n ion in an ear 1 i er r i tu a 1. Thi s 
ceremony recalled MU's occupation during the Civil War by 
Confederate General Albert Gallatin Jenkins. Afterwards, 
the KAs announced a Rose o� Old South Queen and, accompanied 
by area high school ba�ds, paraded to Huntington's City Hall 
where the mayor or city manager officially surrendered the 
city to the KAs. During the entire event, KA members wore 
Confederate uniforms, the belles displayed hooped skirts, 
and the Confederate flag flew over the campus and city, 
including City Hall. On Saturday evening the KAs held the 
Old South Ball in the American Legion Hall, where the 
Confederate flag temporarily replaced the American flag. A 
picnic on Sunday afternoon ended the celebration of the Old 
7South Weekend . 
Old South Weekend 1n 1964 was scheduled to begin on 
Thursday April 30. However, the CIP refused to continue to 
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let the ritual go unchallenged. Shortly before the event, 
Pat Austin initiated the CIP's. assault upon the Old South 
Weekend in a letter to the editor of The Parthenon. 
Next weekend, in a ritual commonly known as 
"Old South Weekend," Marshall University will be 
festively reminded of America's most shameful 
crime against itself and all humanity .... I 
consider the proposed celebration, so-called, as 
deplorable. I am appalled by the fact that an 
official of Marshall University plans to 
"surrender" this campus to·an organization that 
considers it honorable to lower the �merican flag 
in favor of the Confederate flag .... 
Austin added that MU and the State of West Virginia 
projected images as being "liberal" and "progressive." Yet, 
MU, a state supported institution, participated in "a 
ceremonious reincarnation of the breakdown of human 
relations in this country.119 Austin said she and many other
black students did not find this action and official 
sanction by MU as being liberal or progressive, but quite 
the contrary. Instead, the KAs' celebration of the Old 
South represented a glorification of a system based on 
slavery and racial oppresssion. Tradition or not, many of 
the Old South Weekend rituals undermined blacks' dignity and 
sorely reminded them of their own oppression in the 1960s. 
Blacks found no re�son for people to be reminded of, let 
alone to celebrate, past inhumane practices or needlessly to 
assault blacks with such a display. Austin concluded by 
asking, "Must we bear the humiliation of this celebration 
10another year?" 
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A CIP contingent, which included Austin and Phil 
Carter, backed by the moral support of the Huntington 
Chapter of the NAACP and the West Virginia Human Rights 
Commission, directed this question to President Stewart H. 
Smith at an April 29, 1964, meeting. In a typed statement 
the CIP demanded that Smith withdraw official University 
sanction of the Old South Weekend, ban the use of the 
Confederate flag at University athletic contests, and 
prohibit the Confederate flag from being placed beside the 
Am�rican flag at ROTC balls. Smith's notes taken at the 
meeting indicate that the majority of the discussion 
concerned the CIP's first demand of withdrawal of official 
University sanction of the Old South festivities. Smith 
noted that the CIP's objections to the Old South Weekend 
dealt with the activities on campus and the University's 
participation. The CIP opposed participation by the 
University faculty and administration, drawing of the 
Mason-Dixon line, use of the Confederate flags, the 
surrendering of the campus, and the KAs' secession 
program.11
Realizing that they could not violate the KAs' right to 
celebrate the Old South and knowing that neither the 
fraternity nor the administration would hear of getting rid 
of the Old South festivities, the CIP demanded the Old South 
Weekend ceremonies be removed from the MU campus and the end 
of certain rituals . If MU officials accepted its demands, 
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the Old South celebration would be much diluted and more 
tolerable and sensitive to blacks. The KAs could still 
preserve Lee's spirit and celebrate his birthday and the Old 
South with the more festive aspects of the occasion such as 
the dances, a revised parade and the Sunday picnic. The CIP 
activists thought this to be.a fair solution because they 
saw the traditional Old South Weekend as a violation of 
racial justice and a menace to racial understanding and 
better race relations. In the CIP's statement of demands to 
Smith, Austin and Carter declared, "this outmoded, 
anti-democratic, and un-Christian act is nothing more than a 
deification of race separation. All those who do not act to 
. . . . "12 prevent 1t are sanct1on1ng 1t .... 
Despite the CIP's efforts, Smith continued to sanction 
the KAs' Old South Weekend. He cited insufficient time to 
study the situation properly before the ceremonies began. 
Also, he stated that he had discussed the CIP's complaints 
about the Old South Weekend with the Administrative Cabinet 
and many of the members expressed surprise and failed to see 
a connection between the Old South Weekend and integration. 
Smith promised, though, that he would register the CIP's 
complaints with the KA Order and work to remove questionable 
rituals. To the CIP activists, however, this was just more 
evidence of Smith's, and his administration's, indifference 
and confirmed in their minds that MU was an anti-black 
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institution, a sentiment they had expressed to Smith at 
their April 29th meeting.13
The Student Senate's denial of moral support later that 
evening further convinced the CIP activists of MU's 
anti-black bias. John Cross introduced a resolution calling 
for the Stude�t Senate to oppose ''the Kappa Alpha 
fraternity's receiving administrative sanction for the 
surrenduring of the campus to their glorification of the 
Confederacy .... 1114 Cross stated he introduced the
resolution because black students considered the Old South 
Weekend to be blatant racial discrimination. Though he 
declared that whether or not black's perceptions were 
correct did not matter, his arguments did not appeal to Ann 
Humphreys. She contended that the South could not be 
associated with slavery and that the KAs did not overtly 
connect discrimination with the Old South Weekend. Other 
student senators stated positions similar to Humphreys' and 
led the charge in defeating Cross' resolution, 25-3. Senate 
advisor Simon Perry lamented that "the senate has had 
another opportunity to throttle bigotry and, again, it 
didn't take it.1115 The Student Senate had once again joined
President Smith in perpetuating the status quo and hindering 
positive change to which the GIP responded by announcing 
that the group planned to protest the impending campus 
. 16 ceremonies. 
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True to their word, about twenty-five CIP demonstrators 
marched from the Women's Gym to a stand in front of the old 
Shawkey Student Union where the secession ceremony was to be 
held. However, KA members were prepared for the CIP 
demonstrators. The chapter president, Bill Hendrick, began 
the ceremony with a statement disapproving of the CIP's 
objections. He then stated that the KAs never abused the 
American flag, while a fraternity member on the stand 
unfurled an American flag in place of the usual "Stars and 
Bars" of Dixie. The crowd, including the CIP demonstrators, 
applauded. Next, Stanley· A. Shaw, Dean of Men, stood and 
spoke. Though he did not officially "surrender" the campus 
to the KAs, Dean Shaw declared: 
I am very proud of this organization. Nothing 
would make me happier at this time than to turn 
the campus over to this fraternity. This is their 
idea; they talked it over17mong themselves and
decided to use this plan. 
After Dean Shaw sat down, the KAs said the Pledge of 
Allegiance, sang the National Anthem, and named a new Old 
South Queen. With the conclusion of the campus ceremonies 
the KA members, dressed in suits rather than their 
traditional Confederate uniforms, toured Huntington in cars 
and then returned to their fraternity house. The KAs 
completely skipped the ritual of receiving the surrender of 
City Hall and hoisting the Confederate flag, and did not use 
18a Confederate flag at any time during the day. 
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Apparently, KA members decided for and by themselves to 
alter the Old South ceremony. At least, in his statement 
Dean Shaw stressed that neither the faculty nor the 
administration influenced the KAs' decision to alter their 
ceremony and Hedrick confirmed that the KAs voluntarily and 
independently opted for the changes. He stated that one 
hundred percent of the chapter had voted on the previous 
evening, April 30, to suspend temporarily the traditional 
ceremony in favor of one less controversial. Hedrick and 
the KAs saw nothing wrong with the traditional ceremony and 
hoped for its return, but felt the altered program was 
expedient for the moment.19
Hedrick insisted that the fraternity had the right to 
1 b t t1· • t h "the school hadce e ra e ne ceremony any way i c ose: 
sanctioned the ceremony; we could have carried through with
it completely as we have done in the past .... It was our own d . . 1120 ecision. This seems undeniable. The motive, however, 
is less clear. The KAs could have easily continued their 
traditional celebration. After all, the CIP protested 
anyway.· So, the changes were not to avoid the embarrassment 
of a demonstration. Quite the contrary, the unexpected 
alterations placed the CIP demonstrators in an awkward 
position. How could a protest be made against the American 
flag and students respectably clad in suits who omitted the 
secession program and related rites? Consequently, the KAs' 
purpose could have been to embarrass the CIP by upstaging 
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them. Nancy Potter Matthews considered the KAs' action, 
whether conscious or not, a move to turn the CIP's protest 
into a "non-eve·nt" so attention would be diverted away from 
21 the fraternity and the Greek system. Certainly, Matthews'
analysis of the end result appears correct, but it fails to 
reveal the initial motivation of the KAs. 
Another possible reason for the KAs' decision to change 
their secession ceremony could have stemmed from an 
apprehension of incurring the wrath of their national 
affiliates. According to the national policy of the KA 
Order, secession rituals and other similar ceremonies were 
not a part of the organization's officially sanctioned 
activities. The KA national policy read: 
... But we disapprove of and request the 
abandonment or discontinuance of Sece·ssion 
ceremonies, mock assassinations of Union Military 
leaders and similar displays of anachronistic 
sectionalism. Not only are these occurrences 
misunderstood and consequently criticized, 
bringing unnecessary opprobrium upon the Order but 
also, and more important, they are alien to the 
principles and example
2�
f our spiritual founder
whom we would emulate . 
The KA national policy also elaborated on the use of 
the Confederate flag. The official flag of the KA Order 
consisted of crimson, white and gold bars with a crimson 
Greek symbol. The Confederate flag was not an official 
symbol for the fraternity but it retained its symbolic 
importance. The KAs could display the Confederate flag at 
social functions, inside the fraternity houses, and from 
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flagpoles -- with preference accorded to the American flag. 
So, while the Confederate flag.was an integral part of the 
KA tradition, secession rituals and similar activities as 
practiced by the Beta Epsilon Chapter put the local chapter 
at odds with the KA national policy. In all probability the 
KA national order knew of Beta Epsilon's traditional 
secession ceremonies. But, so long as the local chapter's 
celebration did not cause embarrassment or problems for MU's 
administration, the national was apt to ignore the 
situation. The CIP, however, had drawn considerable 
attention to Beta Epsilon's practices and had put the MU 
administration on the spot. Therefore, the KA national 
might require the Beta Epsilon Chapter to end their 
traditional secession ceremonies. Thus, quite possibly, 
rather than upset the KA national and embarrass themselves, 
the members of Beta Epsilon agreed to make the voluntary 
1 . . h . . 1 23 a terations in t eir ritua 
Of course, the CIP had no way of knowing the KAs would 
change their program, let alone understand why they would do 
so. The CIP only knew that the KAs did change their program 
and consequently they praised the members of KA. Though 
surprised; Phil Caiter called the revised program ''an 
improvement," but hoped for even more changes. Danie 
Stewart and Pat Austin considered the KAs' revisions a 
mature and positive step toward racial understanding and 
justice.24 In a letter to the editor of The Parthenon, Pat
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Austin conveyed the CIP's response to the KAs and their 
revised program. 
The Kappa Alpha Order fraternity has made a 
commendable stand for civil rights. The Civic 
Interest Progressives would like to congratulate 
them for their mature and responsible decision. 
Once made aware that their "ceremony" was 
offensive to a portion of the student body and 
faculty, they so altered it to remove the "most" 
-objectionable aspects .... 
Much progress in the field of human relations 
has been made through demonstrations and the 
creation of public awareness. Kappa Alpha Order 
is to be ��ngratulated for its progressive
behavior. 
In essence, the CIP congratulated the KAs for making 
changes in their Old South celebration, but the CIP 
simultaneously patted themselves on the back for raising the 
objections and demonstrating. The latter was probably done 
to temper praise for the KAs' actions. Evidence of 
modifying the KAs' achievement existed in the phrase 
"altered it to remove the 'most' objectionable aspects." 
The CIP concluded the KAs had made an overture that deserved 
some praise, but further steps needed to be taken. In the 
letter the CIP declared the KAs' action a mandate for MU's 
�dministration. Austin also insisted that though many 
people considered black objections to the Old South 
celebration as "trivial," the event was a major problem to 
black MU students and one which sparked much debate and 
26thinking across the campus. 
The student views expressed in The Parthenon 
unanimously opposed the CIP stand on the Old South Weekend. 
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A KA member, Douglas Pelfrey, defended his fraternity's 
celebration expounding at length on the history of the KA 
Order and on the Old South Weekend. Pelfrey stressed that 
the KAs celebrated "the color, valor, daring and romance" of 
27 the Old South. He asserted that the KA members respected 
the American flag and many of them belonged to military 
reserve units. Pelfrey asserted that too much fuss had been 
made about the Old South Weekend, a celebration enjoyed by 
many and one that did not violate anybody's personal 
freedoms and rights. He concluded by asking the CIP, "to be 
as tolerant with our beliefs as we have and will try to be 
with theirs.1128 
Pelfrey's letter bolstered the KAs' image as the good 
guys and drew written applause from subsequent letter 
writers, all of whom criticized the CIP. Lucretia Ellen 
Metz lambasted the CIP for the pettiness of their protest. 
She felt that how the KAs, a private organization, spent one 
weekend a year was a trivial matter and none of the CIP's 
concern. Surely, she insisted, the CIP could find something 
more important to protest. Peg Guertin and Pete Skiades in 
separate letters accused the CIP of senselessly damaging 
MU's progressive reputation and jeopardizing the "excellent 
race relations that existed."29 Skiades even accused the 
CIP ·of ruining the racial atmosphere at MU. To conclude his 
letter, Skiades wrote: 
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Thank you Miss Austin, Mr. Carter and sheep 
for polluting the harmonious atmosphere and good 
will which once existed on our campus. 
Yes, Miss Austin, this is still the land of 
liberty! 
No, Mr. Carter, not of irresponsibility . 
Yes, Miss Austin, it is the home of the 
brave! 
N�� Mr. Carter, it is not the home of the
slave. 
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In another letter, Chuck Delehanty, a picket for the 
CIP at the White Pantry believed that the group had gone too 
far in attacking MU, and listed criticisms similar to those 
of Metz, Guertin and Skiades and offered his advice on how 
the CIP should proceed in the future. Delehanty reiterated 
that MU was, under President Smith, a progressive civil 
rights institution, and argued the demonstration against the 
KAs hurt the CIP's cause over a grievance he deemed invalid. 
Delehanty advised the CIP to write out its grievances and 
request a discussion of them with President Smith and the 
student body.31
Rarely did five students write on the same issue to The 
Parthenon editor, but even more significantly, each of the 
five who did write, disagreed with the CIP. Apparently, the 
CIP's demonstration against the KAs upset a number of MU 
students. But, the CIP disturbed other people also. John 
R. Brown, a KA alumnus, wrote directly to Smith expressing
his anger at the CIP for raising objections to the Old South 
Weekend and urged �he President not to curtail the KAs' 
celebration in any way. Brown criticized the CIP as a 
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"Johnny-come-lately campus group" that sought "notoriety at 
the expense of an old and established organization. 1132 He
then encouraged Smith to check the alumni list for both 
organizations before making his decision. Brown showed his 
ignorance of KA rules by concluding that the KA national 
would never sanction a chapter engaging in a practice "that 
would embarrass any racial group, even the rabble rousing 
Civic Interest Progressives. 1133 Other KA alumnus may have
expressed their ire to Smith in person and via the 
34 telephone. Despite incurring the displeasure of many MU 
students and the KAs, current members and alumnus, however, 
the CIP had gotten its point across that the Old South 
Weekend offended black students at MU. Although total 
victory had not been secured and MU's black students still 
had to endure the KAs' Old South Weekend, the offensive 
elements of the rituals had been greatly reduced. 
This initial success paled to insignificance, however, 
when the CIP and MU's black students witnessed a reactionary 
backlash as the KA Order celebrated its 100th anniversary in 
1965. The Beta Epsilon Chapter presented President Smith 
with its proposed agenda for the Old South Centennial 
Celebration in early March of 1965. The proposed agenda 
called for a return of some customs omitted from the 1964 
ceremony. For instance, the KAs wanted to draw the 
Mason-Dixon line across campus, sing "Dixie," and use the 
Confederate flag along with the United States flag and 
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singing the "Star Spangled Banner." The KAs' proposed 
agenda for the 1965 Old South Weekend was the traditional 
celebration deleting only the secession ceremonies at MU and 
Huntington's City Hall. Despite this return to old 
standards Smith granted official sanction of the Old South 
Weekend and approved of the KAs' proposed agenda minus the 
drawing of the Mason-Dixon line.35
As might have been_expected, the CIP was not happy with 
the KAs' plans or Smith's approval of them. Alan L. Miller, 
member of MU's Students for a Democratic Society (SOS) and 
sympathic supporter of the CIP, wrote a letter to the editor 
of The Parthenon. In it he expressed the CIP's sentiments, 
explaining that the CIP activists were not against gracious 
living and southern hospitality, but the lifestyle of the 
elite class of the antebellum South which resulted from the 
exploitation of black slaves. The good aspects of the "Old 
South" never belonged to blacks and still did not pertain to 
them in the 1960s. In his concluding paragraph, Miller 
flatly stated the CIP's position concerning the KAs and the 
Old South Weekend: 
The CIP is no more against the good things in 
southern society than is the KA Order, and if the 
KAs would come out as strongly against the evil in 
southern society as they do in favor of the good, 
the CIP would be proud to join them in36heir celebration, instead of opposing them. 
�he CIP never found any reason to join the KAs in their 
Old South celebration. Therefore, .instead of protesting the 
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Old South Weekend in 1965, the CIP created a parallel 
observance called "New South Weekend" for the same weekend 
as the KAs ' celebration. As the bulk of their 
commemoration, the CIP hosted a "Conference on the New 
South'' which included speakers representating the Student 
Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), the Southern 
Conference Educational Fund (SCEF), Students for a 
Democratic Society (SDS), the Congress of Racial Equality 
(CORE), and the Southern Student Organizing Committee 
(SSOC). To counter the KAs' campus ceremonies and _parade on 
Friday, April 30, 1965, the program of the New South 
Conference headlined Steve Weisman, formerly the chair of 
the Graduate Coordinating Committee and member of the 
overall Steering Committee of the Free Speech Movement (FSM) 
at the University of California at Berkeley. Weisman had 
been touring southern college and university campuses to 
present h i s in t e r·p re t at ion of the rec en t F SM even t s at 
Berkeley. Accompanying Weisman on the Friday program was Ed 
Hamlet, campus speaker for SSOC, and folk singer Hedy West. 
Later that evening the CIP held a New South Ball for the 
conference participants and anybody else desiring to share 
in their festivities. For Saturday, May 1, Anne Braden, 
noted civil rights author and editor of the Southern 
Patriot, a SCEF publication, and Stanley Wise, executive of 
SNCC, headed the group of speakers . 37
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
148 
All in all, the New South Conference was quite an 
achievement. The showcase of nationally prominent speakers 
in the field of civil rights plus the social activities did 
an impressive job of demonstrating what the CIP deemed as a 
positive celebration of the South. Also, the CIP's 
festivities provided all MU students an alternative to the 
KAs' annual ritual. Once again, the CIP did more than just 
complain; the group took action. Though probably nobody 
intent on attending the KAs' functions changed plans in 
order to participate in the New South activities, the CIP's 
observance still acted as an effective protest against the 
KAs' celebration. The New South observance was a positive 
example of celebration that promoted better race relations 
and an overall understanding of racial problems and 
tensions. By comparison the KAs' Old South Weekend could 
more clearly be seen as a barrier to racial justice and 
equality which was allowed to retard race relations at MU 
and in the Huntington community . 
Still, several whites could not and did not perceive 
any problems with the Old South celebration. To them, the 
whole weekend was just an innocent social gala. Yet, many 
black students at MU and in the CIP considered several of 
the traditional Old South ceremonies to be offensive, and 
found it difficult to appreciate southern gallantry and 
romanticism when remembering the degrading oppression of the 
black race that helped to perpetuate the gracious living of 
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the Old South. A couple of the KAs' traditional customs 
greatly offended MU's black students. Most obvious were the 
secession cermonies which had the official sanction and 
participation of MU's administration. By 1964, blacks and 
the CIP activists could no longer tolerate.the 
administration's endorsement of a return to "plantation 
mentality. 1138 Something had to be done to alleviate the
situation. Blacks and CIP activists would have liked to 
have ended the celebration by the fraternity, but could not 
deny the KAs' right to celebrate the Confederacy. However, 
the CIP requested a different, more realistic image that 
acknowledged the negative aspects as well as the positive . 
The overall change blacks desired in the Old South Weekend 
was never quite achieved and the KAs continued their 
modified celebration through at least 1971. The CIP was 
successful, however, in obtaining the stated goal of 
removing the most offensive aspects of the KAs' celebration 
and, by doing so, began creating an expanded racial 
awareness at MU by exposing discrminatory practices on 
campus, particularly within the Greek system.39 
Besides hosting the New South Conference to protest 
against the KAs' Old South Weekend, the CIP had already 
exerted a tremendous amount of pressure by focusing 
attention on the Greek system at MU in Spring 1965. On 
March 13, 1965, the CIP exploited an incident at the Sigma 
Phi Epsilon (SPE) fraternity's annual "Blue Mountain Blast" 
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at the Police Farm in Wayne County, West Virginia. The 
fraternity hired an all black band to perform at the dance. 
As the evening proceeded, several of the participants at the 
dance consumed a considerable amount of beer, especially 
Mitchell Joseph Thomas, a SPE fraternity member, and Kenneth 
40Rand Stewart, a guest at the dance. 
After the dance ended around midnight, fraternity 
members attempted, without success, to subdue Thomas and 
Stewart, who were shadow boxing and wrestling in the parking 
lot. A band member, Joseph Goss, was walking nearby 
carrying a base amplifier to a trailer the band had rented 
to haul its instruments. Thomas intercepted Goss and asked 
him if he wanted to fight. Goss replied that he did not but 
Thomas struck Goss in the face anyway. The blow knocked 
Goss over the amplifier and damaged it. Another nearby band 
member, Clarence "Rackey" Crawford, Jr., asked who hit Goss. 
When Thomas bragged that he had done it, Crawford removed 
his coat and stepped toward Thomas. A general scuffle 
erupted after somebody knocked Crawford to the ground in an 
effort to restrain him. Stewart escalated the fighting when 
he pounced upon David Chappell, husband of the band's agent, 
and struck blows to his head. Stewart was then struck in 
the head with a bottle. A few SPE members joined in the 
fight while others attempted to restore peace. Finally, the 
participants were separated and the band members retreated 
to their cars. Before they were able to leave, however, 
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several SPE members rocked and beat one of the cars, 
frightening its driver into bumping a parked vehicle.41 
Early Sunday morning, Phil Carter, Danny Hall, Michael 
Gray, and another CIP member went to the SPE fraternity 
house and spoke with fraternity members Andy McQueen and Ray 
Twohig about the incident with the band. Gray described the 
encounter this way:
These were two moderates in the fraternity as I 
viewed it. Real smooth fellows ... and they came 
down[stairs] trying to calm us and Phil down to 
point out that it was a very unfortunate incident. 
Phil [Carter] wanted to talk to the guys who were 
responsible for the incident but couldn't because 
they were upstairs passed out� .. they [McQueen and 
Twohig] tried to e��lain to us that it was all
liquor talking .... 
Carter's and Danny Hall's version, as reported to the 
Marshall University Human Relations Commission's (MUHRC) 
investigating subcommittee, was similiar to Gray's 
recollection. However, when Hall queried Twohig about why 
Thomas had attacked Goss, Hall quoted Twohig's answer as, 
"Well, you know the reason as well as I do." Both Carter 
and Hall also concurred with Twohig's statement that Thomas 
was prejudiced against blacks. Hall and Carter believed 
the fight had racial overtones. Also, Carter indicated that 
the SPE fraternity expressed an unwillingness to do much 
about the matter. Carter recounted: 
McQueen and Twohig asked us to keep the 
matter quiet. Twohig tried to reason the thing 
out. We asked them what they planned to do? They 
were very vague, indicating, more or less, that 
nothing would be done. We asked what they intend 
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to do about this kind of individual? They said 
something to the effect that 'Their contributions 
outweighed their weakness. They ��d worked very
hard to get the place decorated.' 
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The fraternity's version of the incident with the band 
and the meeting with the CIP were markedly different from 
the accounts of Carter, Hall and Gray. The fraternity 
representatives, McQueen, Twohig, and Phil Harmon, a 
chaperone at the dance, denied any use of racial slurs at 
the dance and argued that the fraternity was not a party to 
racism. Instead, they insisted drunkenness was responsible 
for the outbreak and the fraternity's witnesses even 
suggested that if any racism existed it was on the part of 
Clarence Crawford, one of the black band members. 
Unsurprisingly, Twohig's version of the Sunday morning 
meeting between the fraternity and the CIP differed from 
Carter's account. In a written statement submitted to Dean 
Shay, Twohig explained: 
We [the fraternity] asked him [Carter] to let us 
handle it, and told him what we knew of it .... We 
told him that we didn't think it was a race riot, 
but that we ·did feel an obligation, further a 
responsibility, to deal with the instigators of 
the incident and to see to it that all damages 
that were repairable be repaired and the band be 
assured as to lack of malice and the obvious 
spontaneity of the entire situation. We further 
requested that he not blow it out of proportion 
and that he recognize it for it was--a small 
tussle involving drunks, and an unfair treatment. 
by thos� dr��ks [sic] of guests of the 
Fraternity. 
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The investigating subcommittee of the MUHRC had a tough 
time deciding where the truth lay. As a result, Simon Perry 
and Wendell English, members of the subcommittee, and Enid 
Chappel, manager and member of the band, attended a meeting 
at Bunche and Conklin Gray's home. She testified that the 
fraternity members had tampered with the band's equipment 
throughout the dance and did use racial slurs during the 
fight. This was contrary to statements she had earlier made 
to Dean Shay according to his summary of her testimony.45 
In any case, the subcommittee finally ruled that 
insufficient evidence existed to determine race as a factor 
in the incident. Rather, the subcommittee concluded that 
" ... it would be best not to treat the matter as a racial 
incident. The evidence is not sufficient to make such a 
conclusion and if we adhere str�ctly to the rules of 
empirical proof neither can we conclude that it was not a 
racially provoked act.1146 Though recommending not to treat
this incident as a racial one through lack of evidence, this 
report rather clearly contradicted Shay's March 7 statement 
to the President in which he reported that "intoxication of 
men, not racial bias, appears to be the reason for the 
attack.1147 In any case, later that evening President Smith,
acting upon Shay's recommendations, banned the Blue Mountain 
Blast, placed the Sigma Phi Epsilon fraternity on probation 
for one year and suspended the two principle instigators of 
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the incident, Thomas and Stewart, from MU for intoxication, 
. 48 
not racism. 
The real controversy was the role of the CIP. The 
fraternity accused the CIP of turning the incident into a 
racial one, when it was not. Also, the fraternity believed 
that if the CIP had not publicized the incident, then the 
fraternity could have smoothBd over the trouble with the 
band quietly and without further embarrassment to itself and 
h U . . 49 t e n1vers1ty. Phil Carter responded to these
allegations by saying that the CIP was not responsible for 
making the dance incident into a racial issue.50
Yet, the CIP appears to have played a significant role 
in making people aware of the incident. After getting no 
satisfaction directly from the fraternity, the CIP brought 
the case before the Huntington Chapter of the NAACP and 
Huntington's Human Rights Commission (HRC). Neither of 
these two entities could do anything about the situation but 
they provided public forums to air the incident. By 
creating public awareness, the CIP placed President Smith in 
such a position that he had to deal with the incident and 
with it the question of discrimination at MU.51
The day after the public airing of the incident at 
Huntington's HRC meeting, Smith made the CIP aware of his 
displeasure. The CIP had filed a complaint with the 
University asking Smith to put the fraternity on probation 
for three years, to suspend the guilty offenders, and to 
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have the fraternity remove Thomas' name from its membership 
role. In an article in The Parthenon, Smith expressed his 
resentment over the CIP's interference and suggestions: 
It is not the prerogative of the CIP or any 
other group to dictate to the University 
Administration what penalities should be given in 
this or any other incident. 
It (the CIP) has a right to protest, but any 
interference in the University's authority to 
administer its rules and regulations is an 
encroachment upon the governing responsibilities 
of the institution. 
The CIP is not a recognized University 
organization, has never requested recognition and 
therefore has no status on the campus . 
By assuming that it can speak for the 
University, although not accountable to the 
University, the CIP has placed itsel§2in a highlyambiguous and indefensible position. 
Nevertheless, as previously noted, Smith did take action in 
the direction of the CIP's request though he reacted upon 
Dean Shay's recommendations, not those of the CIP. 
Nancy Potter Matthews, writing from the perspective of 
the HRC, perceptively analyzed the CIP's impact: 
What the CIP had done, however, was to force 
the university administration to face the problem, 
and it also forced the campus and community to a 
public confrontation with a group charging bias 
and discrimination, something most of the 
community would rather not admit existed, or at 
least5�elieved was the exception rather than therule . 
Not only was President Smith forced to do something but 
he also decided to have MU's own Human Relations Committee 
investigate the incident. Though the investigating 
subcommittee's recommendation publicly confirmed Smith's 
position and actions, MU's Human Relations Committee began 
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an investigation of the Greek system to determine if racial 
prejudice and discrimination existed and what could be done 
to eliminate it. After meeting with fraternity and sorority 
leaders, the Committee's conviction "that discrimination and 
prejudice do exist ... [in the Greek system] at Marshall" was 
f. d 54 con 1rme . The fraternities and sororities were able to
perpetuate segregation through selection methods which 
allowed one "no" vote to reject a pledge. Seemingly, the 
Greek representatives were not receptive to integration. As 
a result, the MUHRC attempted to have projects and 
discussion groups overcome fears and negative racial 
attitudes through interaction, but ultimately to no avail. 
However, the MUHRC had come to recognize campus 
discrimination and lack of concern for racial justice as the 
major problem confronting it. Dean John Shay wrote in the 
MUHRC's annual report: 
Foremost, and perhaps most difficult, is the need 
to change the campus climate of opinion regarding 
racial discrimination. The majority of Marshall 
students appear to be indiffere�5 to the problems 
of their Negro fellow students. 
The CIP maintained heavy pressure on the Greek system 
in the wake of th� Blue Mount�in Blast incident. On March 
24, 1965, Rick Diehl carried the CIP's fight against the 
Greek system back to the Student Senate. The first of his 
two resolutions unanimously passed and placed the Student 
Senate on record as opposing all forms of racial and ethnic 
discrimination that occurred anywhere in the "University 
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community." Diehl's second resolution called for the 
formation of a committee specifically to investigate "the 
Greek and non-Greek social system, and if segregation is 
discovered then the Senate will utilize all its influence in 
1. . . h d. . . t· · 11 5
6 e 1m1nat1ng ... t e 1scr1m1na 10n or segregation .... The
Student Senate, however, unceremoniously defeated this 
resolution by a vote of 16-6. Once again, the Senate was 
willing to condemn racial discrimination as a concept but 
would not take active steps towards solving the problem on 
campus. 
Thus the CIP appeared to be back where it started. It 
firmly believed racial discrimination existed in the Greek 
system, but the CIP activists could not exert enough 
pressure by themselves to force President Smith or the 
Student Senate to seek an end to it. Somehow the CIP needed 
to create more pressure. Gerald Sigmon, a black MU student 
apparently unaffiliated with the CIP, provided a much needed 
spark when he wrote a lengthy but well written letter in The 
Parthenon. Sigmon charged MU's Greek system with racial 
bias, religious hypocrisy, moral laxity, selfishness, 
intellectual stagnation, and failure to change. He accused 
the Greek system of perpetuating bigotry, hypocrisy, 
excessive drinking, stealing, lying, cheating, selfishness, 
"an atmosphere of petty concern for social trivia" rather 
than intellectual pursuits, ·and, most importantly, the 
status quo. To Sigmon, improvement could not take place 
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without change. Hoping to be a catalyst of change Sigmon 
issued this challenge to MU's administration: 
It is time for a rigid appraisal of the 
status quo at Marshall University. For years, 
every logical facet of this institution has been 
geared to the acceptance of an illogical premise; 
that the Greek system is a positive force for 
good. We have complacently allowed the system to 
expand until, like a cancer, it controls one out 
of every seven students . 
It is time the administration carried out an 
extensive and discerning analysis of every 
fraternity and every sorority on our campus .. �. 
President Smith and Dean Shay must not be 
afraid of Alumni censure, or Greek pressure. 
Theirs is a task calling for leadership, resolute 
courage7 an�7an unvaccillating unwillingness to
compromise. 
Sigmon's letter provoked an outpouring of responses in 
The Parthenon. Sigmon did receive one letter of praise but 
the rest of the letters were from indignant Greeks anxious 
to criticize Sigmon and defend the Greek system. Most of 
the letters ·accused Sigmon of not using facts or 
exaggerating the ones he did use. Also, the Greek 
supporting respondents repeated the supposedly good things 
the fraternities and sororities did and countercharged that 
Sigmon's allegations could easily be applied to MU's 
independent students.58
Jim Marnell wrote the most creative and revealing 
letter of response. His letter began: 
I was sitting in the den of my five-room 
suite at the fraternity house last Friday, busy 
throwing darts at a picture of Martin Luther King 
and cursing God, mother, and apple pie, when my 
slave brought in the new edition of The Parthenon. 
I beat him for a few minutes because I had found a 
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copy of Plato's "Republic" under his bed in the 
cellar. "We can't have anything that's not 
intellectually stagnating around here. You know 
the rules." I gave him some of my old comics and 
sent him away. 
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Being a member of a Greek fraternity I don't 
read very well so I handed The Parthenon to my 
roommate. She reads pretty well but maybe that's 
because she's not a member of the Greek system .... 
Aroused by my roommate's snickering and deep 
belly laughs over the letter I decided to overcome 
my mental stagnation
5
�omentarily and examine the
boy's six points .... 
Through such creative writing and satire Marnell attempted 
to refute five of Sigmon's six charges. He did not deny the 
charge of racial discrimination within the Greek system. He 
agreed with Sigmon and pointed out that a black MU student 
would have very little chance of being pledged because 
unanimous approval by the members was required. Marnell 
shrugged this off as a fact of life and continued his 
articulate defense.60 So, even though the Greek system did
not officially sanction racial discrimination the 
fraternities and sororities had a structure in place that 
promoted the continuance of segregation. Worse yet, Greeks 
like Marnell no longer denied it and arrogantly snubbed MU's 
black students. 
Sigmon's letter also prompted President Smith to make 
some comments at the annual leadership camp for future 
campus leaders. Smith noted that Sigmon's letter levelled 
serious accusations at MU's Greek system, and he and the 
Greeks would have to respond to Sigmon's challenge. He 
acknowledged that the Greek system was in n�ed of reform, 
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and promised to help all he could, but challenged the Greek 
leaders to "behave like adults by assuming responsibility in 
helping remove the islands of segregation that exist on our 
campus.1161 As a part of his challenge, Smith made the
following declaration: 
During the coming year I expect to see the 
fraternities and sororities at Marshall open their 
doors to all students enrolled at our University. 
I do not ask you to pledge a student because he is 
a Negro. What I ask is that you do not reject a 
student because of his race. All students, 
regardless of color, should be accepted g� the
basis of individual merit and potential. 
As David Peyton later observed in his column in The 
Parthenon, the key word in this statement by President Smith 
was "expect." Usually, the word "expect" denotes a hope for 
the future or a command to be carried out. According to 
Pe y t on-, Pre s id en t Sm i th hedged h i s mean i n g o f " ex p e c t " t o 
represent a challenge, a safe middle ground definition. Any 
forthcoming desegregation in the Greek system still had to 
be done voluntarily by the Greeks themselves. Smith would 
impose no penalty on the Greeks for failure to meet the 
63challenge. 
The CIP utilized President Smith's challenge message by 
thrusting his words before the Student Senate. Rick Diehl 
introduced another resolution to form a committee which 
sought to undermine the "islands of segregation" on campus 
by investigating possible avenues of educating the student 
body and thereby creating better racial awareness and 
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improved attitudes. After Diehl reassured the senators that 
the resolution was not aimed at the Greek system, the 
resolution overwhelmingly passed.64 
By May 1965, the CIP had been able to get MU's Human 
Rights Commission to investigate the Greek system for 
evidence of racial discrimination, had Smith and the Greeks 
admitting that a problem existed, and had prompted the 
Student Senate to create a committee with the ultimate 
purpose of educating against discrimination and eliminating 
anti-black racial attitudes.65 MU's administration, the 
HRC, the Student Senate and members of the Greek system had 
all been made aware, albeit grudgingly, of campus racial 
discrimination. Hence, the CIP played a vital role in 
bringing about campus awareness of discrimination, 
particularly in the Greek system, and thereby forced 
individuals to deal with the issue of civil rights and 
racial justice . 
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Chapter VII 
The Beginning -- Not the End 
In 1963, a group of students at MU formed the CIP as a 
response to the need for action concerning civil rights . 
For over two years the organization sought one goal: 
pasitive change toward racial justice. In order to bring 
about this change, the CIP operated as a "challenge 
organization" which forced decisions to be made on the issue 
of civil rights. According to Phil Carter, the CIP 
was a catalyst to people thinking change. It 
provided an opportunity for people in this area to 
make their civil rights contribution when people 
were making enormous sacrifices of life, and limb, 
and effort, and tremend£us amounts of money
throughout the country. 
Such a challenge group was necessary in Huntington and 
at Marshall to bring about further change. Huntington's old 
guard of black activists bound themselves to civility and 
accommodation. Consequently, only minor victories had 
previously been gained. ·Mu's need for integrated 
establishments for visiting Mid-America Conference athletic 
teams and a desire to appear progressive and abide by the 
1954 Brown decision were more important factors in obtaining 
the integration that had taken place prior to the 1960s. 
For more meaningful change to occur� a group such as the CIP 
had to spearhead the demand for civil rights, not civility 
and the status quo. By focusing attention on problems and 
demanding a response, the CIP questioned the facade of 
• 
• 
168 
racial harmony and forced the status quo to be reexamined 
and altered.2
The CIP challenged racial segregation and 
discrimination practices in Huntington and at Marshall by 
using high visibility protests which forced perpetuators of 
the discriminatory status quo to deal with the issue of 
civil rights and either to remain a part of the problem or 
support racial justice. In Huntington, the CIP used the 
"share-in" for its initial demonstrations because of the 
high publicity generated. Once business owners effectively 
thwarted the share-in tactic, the CIP resorted to other 
forms of high visibility protest such as sit-ins and 
picketing. In most cases these forms of protest succeeded 
in creating sufficient embarrassment and pressure on 
Huntington's business people to force them to integrate and 
abstain from other forms of discrimination. 
The high visibility demonstrations worked because most 
Huntingtonians did not want their insular world exposed and 
these conspicuous forms of protest did just that. Economic 
boycotts and legal proceedings would have been ignored and 
doomed to failure. The high visibility demonstration 
demanded attention and response. Also, the ongoing feud 
with Roba Quesenberry and the White P�ntry served as a 
constant reminder that racism existed in Huntington and that 
the CIP was determined to root it out. In essence, 
Quesenberry's bigoted resistance helped the CIP's cause 
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throughout the rest of'the city. In describing 
Quesenberry's resistance, Phil Carter noted the impact of 
the CIP's encounters at the White Pantry: 
He [Quesenb�rry] did things that were so 
ludicrous, so insane that they were unique. In 
Selma and some of the other places they [white 
resisto�s] gassed people with tear gas. This guy 
was using fumigants. He was locking [black] 
people inside the restaurant, other whites were 
locking them [blacks] outside the
3
restaurant. It 
became a Saturday morning circus. 
Other Huntington businesses wanted to avoid being a 
part of this "Saturday morning circus." As a result, the 
people of Huntington agreed to some changes, such as 
integration of public accommodations, in order to protect 
other parts of the status quo. Nevertheless, the CIP did 
stimulate positive change. The CIP started as a civil 
rights group seeking to eliminate racial discrimination in 
Huntington's business establishments. In this they 
succeeded. The successful completion of this goal coupled 
with graduation stripping the group of its leadership, 
Michael Gray believed, caused the CIP to disband: 
It all just seems natural that the CIPers 
would just fade away because other than my mother 
[Bunche Gray] and some of the adult leadership 
that supported them, it was a student 
organization .... Most of the leaders and the core 
people were Marshall University students .... CIP 
disappeared and maybe the causes disappeared too. 
Everything [was] integrated. So, what CIP was 
about on the surface, the integration of these 
places, [was] no longer the problem that 
exist[ed]. We had other serious problems ... but 
CIP was much more visible with this integration 
bit. So, that problem was gone ... 14 [ CIP] played
its part--well! Outrageously well! 
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Though the CIP initially concentrated on Huntington, 
the organization did become concerned with the need for 
civil rights at MU. To summarize the effect of the CIP on 
MU's campus is difficult at best. By May 1965, when the CIP 
began disbanding, The Parthenon was still reporting on 
charges of racial discrimination and would continue steadily 
to do so. When asked in a The Parthenon poll on May 12, 
1965, about discrimination at Marshall, Wendell English, a 
black student, quipped, "'I have experienced no 
discrimination at Marshall in the last week. Discrimination 
at Marshall is the covert type that smolders under the 
superficial fronts of some of the individual students at 
Marshall. 1 115 Apparently, the CIP could not make prejudice
go away. 
A year later David Peyton wrote in a The Parthenon 
editorial: 
Yet, beneath all the "legal integration" of this 
bright and shining age lies a more subtle form of 
discrimination that is nearly impossible to rout . 
No law can erase it. No federal official can spot 
it. 
It comes from within. Needless to say, this 
discrimination occurs on campus every day. And it 
ta�es some6hing like a dance to prove itsexistence. 
The dance Peyton referred to was a Computer Dance sponsored 
by the Sociology Club on May 13, 1966. Students bought 
tickets to the dance and were match�d by a computer on the 
basis of questionnaires that the students completed. 
Students who bought tickets at the door were p
laced on an
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alternate list. When the second pair of names were called, 
� white male was left without a predetermined partner 
because she had not attended the dance. Therefore, as 
planned, the organizers went to their alternate list. The 
first female called was black. She stood and then rapidly 
sat down when she realized the situation. 
from the alternate list was quickly called. 
A second name 
She too was 
black. Thus, as The Parthenon reported, "the races didn't· 
match and the male half of the couple resumed his seat.117 
After this incident, the dance and the matchmaking 
continued without further confusion. Both black women 
received apologies from the Sociology Club, but the stigma 
of social embarrassment remained. At that time, however, 
humiliation was better than the scandal and social ostracism 
that would have occurred had a racially mixed couple danced 
together. One white female at the dance called the incident 
"the most malicious and degrading thing that I've ever 
witnessed.118 Madeline Wolfe, one of the two black females
who stood as alternates, offered a chilling summation of her 
feelings about the incident: "I came here from a southern 
state, I was about to readjust to the new life I found in 
Huntington. But after this, Huntington shows me a picture 
h. h . . 1 . Al b 119 w ic is typica in a ama. In itself, Wolfe's
assessment was a condemnation of Huntington. However, Wolfe 
could have used the terms "Huntington" and "Marshall 
University" interchangeably. 
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Racial prejudice, discrimination, and bigotry existed 
and after the CIP. When the CIP focused 
the MU campus, the problems were not as clearly obvious 
most whites. President Smith and Marshall perpetuated an
progressivism and blatant bigoted resistance did not 
exist. However, through the demonstrations against Old 
south Week, the Blue Mountain Blast incident, and the 
constant exposure of discrimination within MU's Greek 
system, the CIP made people aware of some of the problems at 
Also, through social activities the CIP made life a 
little easier for many black students at MU, and more 
enjoyable for many students of both races. The group's 
camaraderie afforded comfort to those students who allowed 
their consciences to guide them into supporting civil 
rights . 
Once the CIP created the awareness that discrimination 
pervaded the campus, particularly in the Greek system, 
President Smith supported the end of the KAs' secession 
ceremonies and vowed to work against campus discrimination, 
but depended upon volunteerism rather than exerting direct 
pressure for compliance. After the CIP disbanded in May 
1965, a force for racial change no longer existed at 
Marshall University or in Huntington, W�st Virginia. 
Consequently, President Smith was not pressured to make 
further significant changes in the status quo on campus and 
MU remained a discouraging place for many black students. 
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Within three years, however, another group, Freedom and 
Racial Equality for Everyone (FREE), would pick up the CIP's 
fight against racial discrimination on the MU campus. The 
battle for racial justice started by the CIP resumed.lo 
President Smith, many other campus leaders, and mo-st 
Huntingtonians were probably glad to see the CIP leave; to 
them, the CIP reaped negative change. In speaking about 
President Smith's feelings on the CIP, historian Charles 
Moffat wrote of the sentiments held by the power structure 
at MU and in Huntington, "The recalcitrance of a few black 
students and the infeasibility of some of their demands 
convinced President Smith that certain members of the Civic 
Interest Progressives had 'succeeded in undoing much of the 
progress made at MU in the area of improved human 
relations. 11111 In other words, the CIP had violated
President Smith's perception of change and upset the status 
quo of his calm and placid campus and the city of 
Huntington . 
The CIP challenged people to think and either to 
support civil rights or become a part of the problem through 
non-action. More importantly, they advocated change and 
that was not a well received concept in Huntington or at MU. 
The power structure at MU, in Huntington, and in the state 
of West Virginia all opposed the change advocated by the 
CIP, and may even have gone so far as to keep CIP leaders 
under surveillance. For example, in 1967 Phil Carter 
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returned to Huntington to do some anti-poverty work. Gray 
drove him from Huntington to Charleston to catch a flight to 
Cleveland, Ohio. Gray recalled that when they, 
arrived at the Alleghany Airline desk ... the clerk, 
upon learning Carter's name, told Carter that the 
FBI had just called asking if he had yet boarded 
the plane. Obviously, the authorities kept tabs 
on Phil �,rter and quite probably on the other CIP 
leaders. 
· President Smith may or may not have found Phil Carter
and the CIP quite so menacing as to need to know their 
whereabouts and movements. However, Smith and most of the 
faculty and student body saw the CIP as a disruptive force 
attempting to upset their apple cart of racial complacency 
with its rhetoric and demonstrations. Consequently, the 
following statement by Michael Gray applies to MU as well as 
Huntington and the state of West Virginia. 
When Phil [Carter] was in West Virginia some type 
of authority network knew .... It was for real. 
They really felt, for some reason, that Phil 
[Carter] and Pat [Austin] were dangerous, and 
maybe they were dangerous in li§ht of what they 
wanted to achieve -- equality. 
Marshall University and the city of Huntington were not 
ready for that in the 196Os. The CIP forced the leaders in 
these places to deal with the civil rights issue. It 
accepted the challenge of the 196Os and insisted others do 
the same. Sometimes it succeeded; other efforts failed. 
However, at the very least, the CIP refused to allow 
Huntington and Marshall University to ignore their own 
racism any longer. Ultimate victory took, perhaps will 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
take, more time, but the CIP began the movement toward 
racial justice . 
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Chapter VII Notes 
1Interview with Philip W. Carter, 7 April 1986 .
2The concept of civility and how it was not conducive
to civil rights came from William H. Chafe, Civilities and 
Civil Rights (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981). 
3Interview with· Philip W. Carter, 10 July 1986, tape
2 • .
4Interview with Michael G�ay, 18 April 1986, tape 2.
In an interview on 7 April 1986, Phil Carter confirmed 
Gray's perceptions of the CIP's success in Huntington and 
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